{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-71272", "assignerOrgId": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "TuranSec", "dateReserved": "2026-08-05T12:23:34.967Z", "datePublished": "2026-08-05T12:26:19.395Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T15:54:41.075Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"title": "Memos Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext()", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext() (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost() and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address. Because net.Dialer.DialContext() performs its own independent DNS resolution, an attacker controlling DNS for the webhook's hostname (e.g. via a short TTL) can return a public, allowed IP during validation and a different, internal IP at dial time \u2014 a classic time-of-check/time-of-use DNS-rebinding bypass of the SSRF protection."}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "description": "CWE-367", "cweId": "CWE-367", "type": "CWE"}]}], "affected": [{"vendor": "usememos", "product": "memos", "programFiles": ["internal/webhook/webhook.go"], "versions": [{"version": "0", "lessThanOrEqual": "0.29.1", "status": "affected", "versionType": "semver"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"version": "3.1", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N", "baseScore": 8.5, "baseSeverity": "HIGH"}}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/usememos/memos"}, {"url": "https://github.com/usememos/memos/blob/main/internal/webhook/webhook.go"}], "credits": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Alibek Baxtiyorov", "type": "finder"}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c", "shortName": "TuranSec", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:52:35.512Z"}}, "adp": [{"metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"timestamp": "2026-08-05T15:54:35.331224Z", "id": "CVE-2026-71272", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3"}}}], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T15:54:41.075Z"}}]}}

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{"affected": [{"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "semver", "value": "[0,0.29.1]"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 100.0, "confidence_source": "matching", "scores": [{"score": 100.0, "source": "matching"}]}, "original": {"product": "memos", "source": "cna", "vendor": "usememos"}, "product": "memos", "vendor": "usememos"}], "created": "2026-08-05T14:45:16.596590+00:00", "updated": "2026-08-05T15:00:05.509450+00:00", "vendors": ["usememos", "usememos$PRODUCT$memos"]}