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Tracking
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| Link | Providers |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/crater-invoice/crater |
|
Wed, 05 Aug 2026 14:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Wed, 05 Aug 2026 11:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Crater's NotePolicy checks only a blanket Bouncer ability (manage-all-notes / view-all-notes) with no company-ownership comparison, unlike InvoicePolicy and other sibling policies which additionally verify $user->hasCompany($model->company_id). NotesController's show(), update(), and destroy() actions authorize via $this->authorize('view notes'/'manage notes') without passing the target Note model, and Note's company-scoping (scopeWhereCompany) is applied only in the list endpoint, not in show/update/destroy. Any authenticated user of one company can read, edit, or delete another company's notes by ID. This is a distinct finding from the previously reported CustomerPolicy company-ownership omission (a different policy class and controller). | |
| Title | Crater: Cross-Company IDOR on Notes via Missing Company-Ownership Check in NotePolicy | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-639 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Subscriptions
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: TuranSec
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-05T12:52:20.107Z
Reserved: 2026-08-05T10:53:53.176Z
Link: CVE-2026-71242
Updated: 2026-08-05T12:52:17.587Z
No data.
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OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-08-05T13:00:16Z