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Wed, 19 Aug 2026 20:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Lemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Prior to 0.19.19 and 1.0.0-beta.1, actix-web ConnectionInfo::realip_remote_addr reads the first value of X-Forwarded-For as the client address used by raw_ip_key in crates/utils/src/rate_limit/mod.rs. Lemmy's bundled docker/nginx.conf uses $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for instead of $remote_addr, which appends the real client address to an X-Forwarded-For value supplied by the client. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore place a different spoofed address first on each request and receive a new rate-limit bucket, bypassing limits on POST /api/v4/account/auth/register, POST /api/v4/account/auth/login, POST /api/v4/post, POST /api/v4/comment, GET /api/v4/search, POST /api/v4/image, and POST /api/v4/account/import_settings. This permits excessive account creation, brute-force attempts, spam, scraping, uploads, and repeated imports. This issue is fixed in versions 0.19.19 and 1.0.0-beta.1. | |
| Title | Lemmy: Rate limit bypass via X-Forwarded-For header spoofing in actix-web ConnectionInfo | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-799 | |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Subscriptions
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-19T20:27:45.162Z
Reserved: 2026-06-15T23:07:33.233Z
Link: CVE-2026-54738
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Status : Received
Published: 2026-08-19T21:16:58.073
Modified: 2026-08-19T21:16:58.073
Link: CVE-2026-54738
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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