{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-48075", "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M", "dateReserved": "2026-05-20T18:25:25.708Z", "datePublished": "2026-08-06T20:39:34.056Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-06T20:39:34.056Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"title": "OpenReception's unauthenticated add-to-tunnel endpoint accepts arbitrary appointment injections", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-862", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-862: Missing Authorization", "type": "CWE"}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"attackComplexity": "HIGH", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "LOW", "baseScore": 6.5, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L", "version": "3.1"}}], "references": [{"name": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-rhp5-vmcx-4qm8", "tags": ["x_refsource_CONFIRM"], "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-rhp5-vmcx-4qm8"}, {"name": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/4522a44c001782848faff5529d7c1e2be7ac9ef5", "tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/4522a44c001782848faff5529d7c1e2be7ac9ef5"}], "affected": [{"vendor": "open-reception", "product": "appointment-booking-software", "versions": [{"version": "< 1.0.5", "status": "affected"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "shortName": "GitHub_M", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-06T20:39:34.056Z"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.5, the `add-to-tunnel` endpoint creates a new appointment row in any client tunnel without any caller authentication. A request that supplies any valid `tunnelId` and any valid `emailHash` (the two need not belong to the same tunnel) results in an inserted appointment with `status = \"CONFIRMED\"`, attacker-controlled ciphertext fields, attacker-controlled date and duration, and an attacker-chosen agent. The endpoint validates only that some tunnel exists with the given `emailHash`, then writes the appointment using the attacker-supplied `tunnelId` directly. The `emailHash` lookup is effectively an existence check on the tenant; it does not authenticate the caller as the owner of the supplied `tunnelId`. Combined with the absence of any session, Authorization header, booking access token, or PoW, this makes the endpoint accept arbitrary appointment writes into arbitrary tunnels. By contrast, the sibling endpoint `create-new-client` (used to bootstrap a brand-new client tunnel) requires a Bearer bootstrap booking access token issued by the bootstrap-challenge / bootstrap-verify flow. The `add-to-tunnel` endpoint, intended for return-clients booking additional appointments, has no equivalent gate. The application's own middleware confirms this is intentional: `add-to-tunnel` is explicitly listed in the apiAuthHandle public-route allowlist alongside the bootstrap and challenge endpoints (which legitimately have no session). Version 1.0.5 fixes the issue."}], "source": {"advisory": "GHSA-rhp5-vmcx-4qm8", "discovery": "UNKNOWN"}}}}

{}

{}

{}

{"created": "2026-08-07T01:00:05.867140+00:00", "updated": "2026-08-07T01:00:05.867146+00:00", "vendors": []}