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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-3390 | 3 Linux, Netapp, Redhat | 12 Linux Kernel, H300s, H410c and 9 more | 2026-07-22 | 7.8 High |
| A use-after-free vulnerability was found in the Linux kernel's netfilter subsystem in net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c. Mishandled error handling with NFT_MSG_NEWRULE makes it possible to use a dangling pointer in the same transaction causing a use-after-free vulnerability. This flaw allows a local attacker with user access to cause a privilege escalation issue. We recommend upgrading past commit 1240eb93f0616b21c675416516ff3d74798fdc97 | ||||
| CVE-2026-64032 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-22 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bridge: mcast: Fix a possible use-after-free when removing a bridge port When per-VLAN multicast snooping is enabled, the bridge iterates over all the bridge ports, disables the per-port multicast context on each port and enables the per-{port, VLAN} multicast contexts instead. The reverse happens when per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled. When global multicast snooping is enabled, the bridge iterates over all the bridge ports and enables the per-port multicast context on each port. The reverse happens when multicast snooping is disabled. The above scheme can result in a situation where both types of contexts (per-port and per-{port, VLAN}) are enabled on a single bridge port: # ip link add name br1 up type bridge mcast_snooping 1 mcast_querier 1 vlan_filtering 1 # ip link add name dummy1 up master br1 type dummy # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_vlan_snooping 1 # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_snooping 0 # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_snooping 1 This is not intended and it is a problem since the commit cited below. Prior to this commit, when removing a bridge port, br_multicast_disable_port() would disable the per-port multicast context and the per-{port, VLAN} multicast contexts would get disabled when flushing VLANs. After this commit, br_multicast_disable_port() only disables the per-port multicast context if per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled. If both types of contexts were enabled on the port when it was removed, the per-port multicast context would remain enabled when freeing the bridge port, leading to a use-after-free [1]. Fix by preventing the bridge from enabling / disabling the per-port multicast contexts when toggling global multicast snooping if per-VLAN multicast snooping is enabled. [1] ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: ffff88810f8bda78 object type: timer_list hint: br_ip6_multicast_port_query_expired (net/bridge/br_multicast.c:1927) WARNING: lib/debugobjects.c:629 at debug_print_object+0x1b1/0x3e0, CPU#5: swapper/5/0 [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> __debug_check_no_obj_freed (lib/debugobjects.c:1116) kfree (mm/slub.c:2620 mm/slub.c:6250 mm/slub.c:6565) kobject_cleanup (lib/kobject.c:689) rcu_do_batch (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2617) rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2869) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:656 kernel/softirq.c:496 kernel/softirq.c:735) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:752) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1061 (discriminator 47) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1061 (discriminator 47)) </IRQ> | ||||
| CVE-2026-63969 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in rt6_fill_node() Sashiko reported this issue [1]. Apply the same fix as commit f8d8ce1b515a ("ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_info_uses_dev()"). Writers holding tb6_lock can list_del_rcu(&rt->fib6_siblings) without waiting for RCU readers; rt->fib6_siblings.next then still points into the old ring and this softirq-side walker never reaches &rt->fib6_siblings, causing a CPU stall. fib6_del_route() always WRITE_ONCE()s rt->fib6_nsiblings to 0 before list_del_rcu(), so an inside-loop check is a reliable detach signal. [1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260526020227.4857-1-jiayuan.chen%40linux.dev | ||||
| CVE-2026-63979 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-22 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: hand off the pinned file reference to accept_doit handshake_req_next() removes the request from the per-net pending list and drops hn_lock before handshake_nl_accept_doit() reads req->hr_sk->sk_socket and dereferences sock->file (once in FD_PREPARE() and again in get_file()). In that window a consumer running tls_handshake_cancel() followed by sockfd_put() (svc_sock_free) or __fput_sync() (xs_reset_transport) releases sock->file. sock_release() then runs sock_orphan(), zeroing sk_socket, and frees the struct socket. The accept-side code either reads NULL through sk_socket or chases freed memory. The submit-side sock_hold() does not prevent this. sk_refcnt protects struct sock, but struct socket and sock->file are independently refcounted via the file descriptor the consumer owns. Pinning sk leaves sock and sock->file unprotected. Retarget the accept-side dereferences at req->hr_file, which was pinned at submit time, instead of req->hr_sk->sk_socket->file. Pinning on its own is not sufficient: a consumer that cancels between handshake_req_next() returning and accept_doit reaching FD_PREPARE() takes the !remove_pending() branch in handshake_req_cancel() and drops hr_file before the accept side takes its own reference. Hand off an additional file reference inside handshake_req_next(), under hn_lock, so the accept side operates on a reference that no concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can revoke. FD_PREPARE() consumes that handed-off reference, either by transferring it to the new fd in fd_publish() or by dropping it in the cleanup destructor on error; the explicit get_file() that previously balanced FD_PREPARE() is therefore redundant and goes away. Update handshake_req_cancel_test2 and _test3 to simulate the FD_PREPARE() consumption with an fput() so the kunit file-count assertions stay balanced. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64002 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-22 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: free net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports after unregister_net_sysctl_table() ipv4_sysctl_exit_net() is currently freeing net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports too soon. Only after unregister_net_sysctl_table() we can be sure no threads can possibly use the sysctls, including /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_reserved_ports. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64029 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-22 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: Serialize UMP output teardown with event_input seq_ump_process_event() borrows client->out_rfile.output without synchronizing with the first-open and last-close transition in seq_ump_client_open() and seq_ump_client_close(). The last output unuse can therefore drop opened[STR_OUT] to zero and release the rawmidi file while an in-flight event_input callback is still inside snd_rawmidi_kernel_write(). That leaves the rawmidi substream runtime exposed to teardown before the write path has taken its own buffer reference. Add a per-client rwlock for the event_input-visible output file. Publish a newly opened output file under the write side, and hold the read side from the output lookup through snd_rawmidi_kernel_write(). The last output close copies and clears the visible output file under the write side, then drops the lock and releases the saved rawmidi file. Use IRQ-safe rwlock guards because event_input can also be reached from atomic sequencer delivery. The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order within that path: path A label: event_input path path B label: last unuse path 1. seq_ump_process_event() reads 1. seq_ump_client_close() client->out_rfile.output. drops opened[STR_OUT] to zero. 2. snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1() 2. snd_rawmidi_kernel_release() has not yet pinned runtime. closes the output file. 3. The writer continues using 3. close_substream() frees the borrowed substream. substream->runtime. This keeps the output substream and runtime alive for the full event_input write while keeping rawmidi release outside the rwlock. KASAN reproduced this as a slab-use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1(), with allocation through seq_ump_use()/snd_seq_port_connect() and free through seq_ump_unuse()/snd_seq_port_disconnect(). Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN slab-use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x9d/0x400 RIP: 0033:0x7f5528af837f Read of size 8 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0xb0 (?:?) print_report+0xd1/0x650 (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x1a7/0x340 (?:?) kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x64/0x200 (?:?) kasan_report+0xf7/0x130 (?:?) snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x9d/0x400 (?:?) __asan_load8+0x82/0xb0 (?:?) update_stack_state+0x1ef/0x2d0 (?:?) snd_rawmidi_kernel_write+0x1a/0x20 (?:?) seq_ump_process_event+0xd4/0x120 (sound/core/seq/seq_ump_client.c:82) __snd_seq_deliver_single_event+0x8a/0xe0 (?:?) snd_seq_deliver_from_ump+0x2b2/0xd60 (?:?) lock_acquire+0x14e/0x2e0 (?:?) find_held_lock+0x31/0x90 (?:?) snd_seq_port_use_ptr+0xa6/0xe0 (?:?) __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 (?:?) do_raw_read_unlock+0x32/0xa0 (?:?) _raw_read_unlock+0x26/0x50 (?:?) snd_seq_deliver_single_event+0x45c/0x4b0 (?:?) snd_seq_deliver_event+0x10d/0x1b0 (?:?) snd_seq_client_enqueue_event+0x192/0x240 (?:?) snd_seq_write+0x2cd/0x450 (?:?) apparmor_file_permission+0x20/0x30 (?:?) security_file_permission+0x51/0x60 (?:?) vfs_write+0x1ce/0x850 (?:?) __fget_files+0x12b/0x220 (?:?) lock_release+0xc8/0x2a0 (?:?) __rcu_read_unlock+0x74/0x2d0 (?:?) __fget_files+0x135/0x220 (?:?) ksys_write+0x15a/0x180 (?:?) rcu_is_watching+0x24/0x60 (?:?) __x64_sys_write+0x46/0x60 (?:?) x64_sys_call+0x7d/0x20d0 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x360 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) | ||||
| CVE-2026-63861 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: mtk-snfi: unregister ECC engine on probe failure and remove() callback mtk_snand_probe() registers the on-host NAND ECC engine, but teardown was missing from both probe unwind and remove-time cleanup. Add a devm cleanup action after successful registration so nand_ecc_unregister_on_host_hw_engine() runs automatically on probe failures and during device removal. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63864 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-22 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Propagate error from visit_tailcall_insn Commit e40f5a6bf88a ("bpf: correct stack liveness for tail calls") added visit_tailcall_insn() but did not check its return value. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63865 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-22 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Drop task_to_inode and inet_conn_established from lsm sleepable hooks bpf_lsm_task_to_inode() is called under rcu_read_lock() and bpf_lsm_inet_conn_established() is called from softirq context, so neither hook can be used by sleepable LSM programs. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63867 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-22 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: close TOCTOU race while computing rcv_wnd The MPTCP output path access locklessly the MPTCP-level ack_seq in multiple times, using possibly different values for the data_ack in the DSS option and to compute the announced rcv wnd for the same packet. Refactor the cote to avoid inconsistencies which may confuse the peer. Also ensure that the MPTCP level rcv wnd is updated only when the egress packet actually contains a DSS ack. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63869 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-22 | 7.6 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: limit injected antenna index in ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap When parsing the radiotap header of an injected frame, ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap() uses the IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_ANTENNA value directly as a shift count: info->control.antennas |= BIT(*iterator.this_arg); *iterator.this_arg is an 8-bit value taken straight from the frame supplied by userspace, so BIT() can be asked to shift by up to 255. That is undefined behaviour on the unsigned long and is reported by UBSAN: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/mac80211/tx.c:2174:30 shift exponent 235 is too large for 64-bit type 'unsigned long' Call Trace: ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0xadb/0x1950 net/mac80211/tx.c:2174 ieee80211_monitor_start_xmit+0xb1f/0x1250 net/mac80211/tx.c:2451 ... packet_sendmsg+0x3eb6/0x50f0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3109 info->control.antennas is a 2-bit bitmap (u8 antennas:2), so only antenna indices 0 and 1 can ever be represented. Ignore any larger value instead of shifting out of bounds. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63870 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-22 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ieee802154: 6lowpan: only accept IPv6 packets in lowpan_xmit() The aoe driver (or similar) generates a non-IPv6 packet (e.g., ETH_P_AOE) and queues it for transmission via dev_queue_xmit() on a 6LoWPAN interface (configured by the user or test case). Since the packet is not IPv6, the 6LoWPAN header_ops->create function (lowpan_header_create or header_create) returns early without initializing the lowpan_addr_info structure in the skb headroom. In the transmit function (lowpan_xmit), the driver calls lowpan_header (or setup_header) which unconditionally copies and uses the lowpan_addr_info from the headroom, which contains uninitialized data. Fix this by dropping non IPv6 packets. A similar fix is needed in net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c bt_xmit(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-63874 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-21 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mctp: usb: fix race between urb completion and rx_retry cancellation It's possible that sequencing between setting ->stopped and cancelling the rx_retry work (in ndo_stop) could leave us with an urb queued: T1: ndo_stop T2: rx_retry_work ------------ ---------------- LD: ->stopped => false ST: ->stopped <= true usb_kill_urb() mctp_usb_rx_queue() usb_submit_urb() cancel_delayed_work_sync() That urb completion can then re-schedule rx_retry_work. Strenghen the sequencing between the stop (preventing another requeue) and the cancel by updating both atomically under a new rx lock. After setting ->rx_stopped, and cancelling pending work, we know that the requeue cannot occur, so all that's left is killing any pending urb. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63875 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-21 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: tlb: Flush walk cache when unsharing PMD tables When huge_pmd_unshare() is called to unshare a PMD table, the tlb_unshare_pmd_ptdesc() function sets tlb->unshared_tables=true but the aarch64 tlb_flush() only checked tlb->freed_tables to determine whether to use TLBF_NONE (vae1is, invalidates walk cache) or TLBF_NOWALKCACHE (vale1is, leaf-only). This caused the stale PMD page table entry to remain in the walk cache after unshare, potentially leading to incorrect page table walks. Fix by including unshared_tables in the check, so that when unsharing tables, TLBF_NONE is used and the walk cache is properly invalidated. Here is the detailed distinction between vae1is and vale1is: | Instruction Combination | Actual Invalidation Scope | | ------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------| | `VAE1IS` + TTL=`0` | All entries at all levels (full invalidation) | | `VAE1IS` + TTL=`2` (L2) | Non-leaf at Level 0/1 + leaf at Level 2 | | `VALE1IS` + TTL=`0` | Leaf entries at all levels (non-leaf not cleared) | | `VALE1IS` + TTL=`2` (L2) | Leaf entry at Level 2 only | | ||||
| CVE-2026-63882 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: fix NULL pointer bug in svm_range_set_attr The process_info could be NULL if user doesn't call kfd_ioctl_acquire_vm before calling kfd_ioctl_svm. (cherry picked from commit 83a26c812e0529eb040d31a76f73e33e637243d4) | ||||
| CVE-2026-63886 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-21 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode chap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest as kzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses, passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whether the input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output. chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as long as there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 and the "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characters can reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256 (digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5 (digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes. The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened. The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the length up front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailing base64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data length exceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder. Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded and unpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=', so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged. The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which is kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg at CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1 base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size, DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less than CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment is added at the call site to document this. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63887 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-21 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: iscsi: Bound iscsi_encode_text_output() appends to rsp_buf iscsi_encode_text_output() concatenates "key=value\0" records into login->rsp_buf, an 8192-byte kzalloc(MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) buffer allocated in iscsit_alloc_login_setup_buffer(). The three sprintf() call sites in this function (lines 1398, 1411, 1424 in v7.1-rc2) never check the remaining buffer capacity: *length += sprintf(output_buf, "%s=%s", er->key, er->value); *length += 1; output_buf = textbuf + *length; The 8192-byte ceiling at iscsi_target_check_login_request() bounds the *input* Login PDU payload, but a single PDU can carry up to 2048 minimal four-byte "a=b\0" pairs, each unknown key expanding to a 16-byte "a=NotUnderstood\0" output record via iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(). 2048 * 16 = 32 KiB of output into an 8 KiB buffer, producing a ~24 KiB heap overrun in the kmalloc-8k slab. The fix introduces a static iscsi_encode_text_record() helper that uses snprintf() with a per-call bounds check against the remaining buffer, and threads a u32 textbuf_size parameter through iscsi_encode_text_output(). Both call sites in iscsi_target_handle_csg_zero() (PHASE_SECURITY) and iscsi_target_handle_csg_one() (PHASE_OPERATIONAL) pass MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS. On overflow the encoder logs the condition, calls iscsi_release_extra_responses() to drop queued records, and returns -1; both caller sites now emit ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_INITIATOR_ERR / ISCSI_LOGIN_STATUS_INIT_ERR via iscsit_tx_login_rsp() before returning, so the initiator sees an explicit failed-login response rather than a silent connection drop. (Prior to this patch only the PHASE_OPERATIONAL caller did that; the PHASE_SECURITY caller is converted to the same shape.) | ||||
| CVE-2026-63889 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-21 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: scsi_transport_fc: Widen FPIN pname walker counter to u32 An adjacent Fibre Channel fabric actor that can deliver an FPIN ELS frame to an lpfc or qla2xxx Linux initiator can trigger a non-return in the generic FC transport. This is not a local userspace or IP network path; the attacker must be able to inject fabric traffic, for example as a compromised switch or fabric controller, or as a same-zone N_Port on a fabric that permits source spoofing. The Link-Integrity and Peer-Congestion FPIN walkers used a u8 loop counter against the 32-bit on-wire pname_count field, and did not bound pname_count by the descriptor body already validated by the TLV walker. A pname_count of 256 therefore wraps the counter and keeps the loop condition true indefinitely. Factor the shared pname_list[] walk into one helper, widen the counter to u32, and clamp pname_count against the entries that fit in the descriptor body before iterating. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63891 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-21 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: property: Cap recursion depth in __tb_property_parse_dir() A DIRECTORY entry's value field is used as the dir_offset for a recursive call into __tb_property_parse_dir() with no depth counter. A crafted peer that chains DIRECTORY entries into a back-reference loop drives the parser until the kernel stack is exhausted and the guard page fires. Any untrusted XDomain peer (cable, dock, in-line inspector, adjacent host) that reaches the PROPERTIES_REQUEST control-plane exchange can trigger this without authentication. Thread a depth counter through tb_property_parse() and __tb_property_parse_dir(), and reject blocks that exceed TB_PROPERTY_MAX_DEPTH = 8. That is comfortably larger than any observed legitimate XDomain layout. Operators who do not need XDomain host-to-host discovery can disable the path entirely with thunderbolt.xdomain=0 on the kernel command line. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63893 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-21 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: property: Reject u32 wrap in tb_property_entry_valid() entry->value is u32 and entry->length is u16; the sum is performed in u32 and wraps. A malicious XDomain peer can pick value = 0xffffff00, length = 0x100 so the sum 0x100000000 wraps to 0 and passes the > block_len check. tb_property_parse() then passes entry->value to parse_dwdata() as a dword offset into the property block, reading attacker-directed memory far past the allocation. For TEXT-typed entries with the "deviceid" or "vendorid" keys this lands in xd->device_name / xd->vendor_name and is readable back via the per-XDomain device_name / vendor_name sysfs attributes; the leak is NUL-bounded (kstrdup() stops at the first zero byte) and untargeted (the attacker picks a delta, not an absolute address). DATA-typed entries are parsed into property->value.data but not generically surfaced to userspace. Use check_add_overflow() so a wrapped sum is rejected. | ||||