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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-72196 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: bound copy_lcns dp->page_lcns[] index in analysis pass In log_replay()'s analysis pass, after find_dp() returns a valid DIR_PAGE_ENTRY for the (target_attr, target_vcn) tuple, the copy_lcns block walks lrh->lcns_follow further entries: t16 = le16_to_cpu(lrh->lcns_follow); for (i = 0; i < t16; i++) { size_t j = (size_t)(le64_to_cpu(lrh->target_vcn) - le64_to_cpu(dp->vcn)); dp->page_lcns[j + i] = lrh->page_lcns[i]; } find_dp() only validates that target_vcn falls within [dp->vcn, dp->vcn + dp->lcns_follow), i.e., that the FIRST cluster is covered. The walk through the further entries is not bounded against dp->lcns_follow. For a malformed LRH where target_vcn = dp->vcn + dp->lcns_follow - 1 and lrh->lcns_follow > 1, the i > 0 writes overflow the dp's allocated page_lcns[] array. Add the missing j + lrh->lcns_follow <= dp->lcns_follow guard. Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 as a slab-out-of-bounds write of size 8 from log_replay+0x68d4 on the mount path. This is distinct from Pavitra Jha's 2026-05-02 patch ("fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion", <20260502154252.164586-1-jhapavitra98@gmail.com>) which addresses the separate version-0 dirty-page-table conversion path's memmove(&dp->vcn, ...) call. The two fixes are complementary; both should land. [almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes, fixed conflicts] | ||||
| CVE-2026-72195 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: bound attr_off in UpdateResidentValue against data_off In do_action()'s UpdateResidentValue case (fslog.c:3307), lrh->attr_off and lrh->redo_len come from the on-disk LRH. When they satisfy aoff + dlen < attr->res.data_off, the assignment attr->res.data_size = cpu_to_le32(aoff + dlen - data_off); underflows to ~4 GiB (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9 when aoff=0x10, dlen=1, data_off=0x18). Subsequent code that reads attr->res.data_size to walk the resident attribute payload would then read up to 4 GiB past the 1024-byte MFT record allocation. The existing mi_enum_attr() defense in fs/ntfs3/record.c:287 catches the corrupted data_size on the next attribute walk and fails the mount, but only on the path that walks all attributes. A read site that picks an attribute by name and reads its data_size without re-validating is not covered. Validate aoff against data_off and asize at the source. Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 via pr_warn-only probe: with aoff=0x10 and data_off=0x18, the post-assignment data_size is 0xfffffff9 (mount then fails at -22 from mi_enum_attr). [almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes] | ||||
| CVE-2026-72194 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: add depth limit to indx_find_buffer to prevent stack overflow indx_find_buffer() recursively descends the B+ tree index with no depth limit. A crafted NTFS image with circular index node references causes unbounded recursion, overflowing the kernel stack and panicking the system. This is reachable by mounting a malicious NTFS filesystem (e.g. from a USB drive via desktop automount) and deleting a file whose index entry triggers the rebalancing fallback path in indx_delete_entry(). Add a depth parameter and bail out with -EINVAL when it reaches the fnd->nodes array bound, matching the constraint already enforced by fnd_push() in indx_find(). The related function indx_find() was previously patched for a similar infinite-loop issue (commit 1732053c8a6b), but indx_find_buffer() was missed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72192 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: bound to_move in indx_insert_into_root before hdr_insert_head indx_insert_into_root() promotes a full resident $INDEX_ROOT into $INDEX_ALLOCATION and copies all non-last resident root entries into a newly allocated INDEX_BUFFER via hdr_insert_head(). The source byte count 'to_move' is summed from the on-disk resident entry sizes and is independent of the destination buffer size, which comes from root->index_block_size (via indx->index_bits). A crafted NTFS image that keeps a valid, full resident root but shrinks root->index_block_size down to 512 after the root has been populated makes hdr_insert_head() memcpy attacker-controlled resident entry bytes past the end of the kmalloc(1u << indx->index_bits) allocation returned by indx_new(). For a 512-byte destination and a resident root whose non-last entries total 560 bytes, the memcpy overruns by 120 bytes and a following memmove extends the highest written offset to 136 bytes past the allocation. The overflow bytes are a direct copy of on-disk entries (via kmemdup), so they are fully attacker-controlled. The write is reachable from unprivileged open(O_CREAT) on a mounted crafted NTFS image: a single sufficiently long create in a directory whose resident root is already full forces root promotion and triggers the copy. This is a controlled out-of-bounds write of 120-136 bytes past a kmalloc(index_block_size) allocation, with attacker-controlled content. It is a bounded adjacent-heap corruption primitive; it is not an arbitrary-address write. Successful exploitation into a named victim object depends on the surrounding slab layout. Reject the copy at the sink. The destination's INDEX_HDR already reports hdr_total (the payload capacity of the new buffer) and hdr_used (the bytes already consumed by the terminal END entry installed by indx_new()); require that to_move fits in the remaining payload before calling hdr_insert_head(). On mismatch, fail with -EINVAL and mark the filesystem as having a detected on-disk inconsistency, which is the same behaviour as the surrounding validation in this function. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72191 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: validate split-point offset in indx_insert_into_buffer indx_insert_into_buffer() computes used = used1 - to_copy - sp_size; memmove(de_t, Add2Ptr(sp, sp_size), used - le32_to_cpu(hdr1->de_off)); where sp and sp_size come from hdr_find_split(). hdr_find_split() walks entries by le16_to_cpu(e->size) without validating that each step stays within hdr->used or that the size field is at least sizeof(struct NTFS_DE). index_hdr_check(), the on-load gatekeeper, only validates header-level fields (used, total, de_off) and does not walk per-entry sizes. A crafted NTFS image whose leaf INDEX_HDR reports used == total but contains one interior NTFS_DE with size = 0xFFF0 therefore passes validation, descends to indx_insert_into_buffer() through the ntfs_create() -> indx_insert_entry() path, and makes hdr_find_split() return an sp whose sp_size (0xFFF0) greatly exceeds the remaining bytes in the buffer. The u32 subtraction underflows and the memmove count becomes a near-4-GiB value, producing an out-of-bounds kernel write that corrupts adjacent allocations and panics the kernel. Reproduced on 7.0.0-rc7 with UML + KASAN via a crafted image and a single 'touch' inside the mounted directory; crash site resolves to fs/ntfs3/index.c at the memmove. Trigger requires only local mount of an attacker-supplied filesystem image (USB, loopback, or removable media auto-mount). Reject the split whenever the chosen sp plus its declared size already extends past hdr1->used. This is the minimal fix; it preserves the existing hdr_find_split() contract and relies on the same out: cleanup path as the pre-existing error returns. A prior OOB read in the very same indx_insert_into_buffer() memmove was fixed in commit b8c44949044e ("fs/ntfs3: Fix OOB read in indx_insert_into_buffer") by tightening hdr_find_e(), but that fix does not cover the split-point size field path addressed here: sp is returned by hdr_find_split(), not hdr_find_e(), and the underflow is driven by sp->size rather than hdr->used exceeding hdr->total. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72188 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: sanitize MFT references returned from ntfs_lookup_inode_by_name() ntfs_lookup_inode_by_name() returns MFT references read from directory index entries on disk. These values are untrusted, but the function can currently return an error-marked MFT reference to its callers without validating it. Callers later decode lookup failures with MREF_ERR(). A crafted NTFS image can set the MREF error bit while leaving the low bits as an arbitrary value, causing callers to consume a bogus pseudo-errno instead of treating the lookup result as corrupted on-disk metadata. Fix this at the source by normalizing every error-marked MFT reference returned from ntfs_lookup_inode_by_name() to ERR_MREF(-EIO). Apply this to all four directory lookup return paths so every caller gets a validated result without needing additional checks or an API change. This keeps the sanitization in the common lookup helper, which is cleaner than duplicating validation in each caller. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72186 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: make system files immutable to prevent corruption When a system file such as $Bitmap is exposed via show_sys_files and written from userspace, the volume is corrupted and, because the cluster allocator scans $Bitmap through the same inode's page cache, a write to $Bitmap also deadlocks writeback against the folio it already holds locked. These files are maintained by the driver itself and have no valid reason to be written through the file interface. Mark base metadata files (mft_no < FILE_first_user) as immutable during inode read so the VFS rejects write, mmap, truncate and unlink with -EPERM. Directories are skipped so the root and $Extend remain usable. Internal metadata updates do not go through the VFS write path and are unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72185 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: fix WARN_ON for resident attribute in ntfs_map_runlist_nolock() When ntfs_map_runlist_nolock() needs to look up the attribute extent containing a target VCN (ctx_needs_reset == true), it calls ntfs_attr_lookup() and then expects the result to be a non-resident attribute, since only non-resident attributes have a mapping pairs array to decompress. A crafted NTFS image can place a resident attribute where a non-resident one is expected, causing ntfs_attr_lookup() to succeed but return a resident attribute record. Previously this was caught only by a WARN_ON(), which does not stop execution. The code then falls through to read a->data.non_resident.highest_vcn from what is actually a resident attribute, accessing the wrong union member and corrupting the VCN range check. The caller path triggering this warning during mount is: ntfs_map_runlist_nolock ntfs_empty_logfile load_system_files ntfs_fill_super In this path ctx is NULL, so ntfs_map_runlist_nolock() allocates a temporary search context internally and sets ctx_needs_reset = true. The existing resident-attribute guard in the ctx != NULL branch already returns -EIO silently for the same condition; make the ctx_needs_reset path consistent by replacing the WARN_ON() with the same -EIO error return. This causes the crafted image to be rejected with a mount error instead of triggering a kernel warning. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72181 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mips: sched: Fix CPUMASK_OFFSTACK memory corruption This patch addresses a critical memory management flaw. When CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is enabled, cpumask_var_t is a pointer. Consequently, sizeof(new_mask) evaluates to the pointer size, causing copy_from_user() to clobber the mask pointer. Furthermore, the old logic performed copy_from_user() before allocating the mask. Fix this by allocating new_mask first. To handle variable-sized user masks correctly, use cpumask_size() to truncate overly large user masks or pad undersized masks with zeros before copying the data directly into the allocated buffer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72175 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/proc/task_mmu: fix make_uffd_wp_huge_pte() prot-update race Patch series "userfaultfd/pagemap: pre-existing fixes". These are pre-existing bug fixes that were carried at the front of the userfaultfd RWP working-set-tracking series up to v5 [1]. Per review feedback that fixes should not sit in the middle of a feature series, they are split out and sent on their own; the RWP series is reposted rebased on top of this. All six were flagged by the Sashiko AI review of the RWP series and carry independent of RWP, apply to mm-new directly, and carry Cc: stable@. 1: fs/proc/task_mmu: a missing huge_ptep_modify_prot_start() in make_uffd_wp_huge_pte() can lose hardware Dirty/Accessed updates when PAGEMAP_SCAN write-protects a hugetlb PTE. 2: fs/proc/task_mmu: pagemap_scan_hugetlb_entry() compares the range against HPAGE_SIZE rather than the hstate page size, so it never write-protects gigantic hugetlb pages. 3: fs/proc/task_mmu: PAGEMAP_SCAN with PM_SCAN_WP_MATCHING over an unpopulated hugetlb range self-deadlocks -- pagemap_scan_pte_hole() calls uffd_wp_range() while walk_hugetlb_range() holds the hugetlb vma lock for read, and hugetlb_change_protection() then takes it for write. Install the marker inline instead. 4: mm/huge_memory: change_non_present_huge_pmd() drops pmd_swp_uffd_wp on a device-private PMD permission downgrade, silently losing the uffd-wp marker. 5: userfaultfd: must_wait() applies pte_write() to a locklessly read PTE without checking pte_present(), so swap/migration entries decode random offset bits and a thread can stay parked on a stale fault. 6: userfaultfd: __VMA_UFFD_FLAGS feeds VMA_UFFD_MINOR_BIT (41) to mk_vma_flags() unconditionally, an out-of-bounds write into the single-word vma_flags_t on 32-bit. Build the mask from config-gated per-mode masks so an unavailable bit is never materialised. This patch (of 6): make_uffd_wp_huge_pte() arms the UFFD_WP bit on a present HugeTLB PTE by calling huge_ptep_modify_prot_commit() with a ptent snapshot that was fetched without the corresponding huge_ptep_modify_prot_start(). The start helper is what atomically clears the entry so the kernel-owned snapshot stays consistent until the commit; without it, the hardware may set Dirty or Accessed in the live PTE between the original read and the commit, and huge_ptep_modify_prot_commit() (whose generic implementation just calls set_huge_pte_at()) then writes the stale snapshot back over the live hardware bits, losing the update. The non-hugetlb sibling make_uffd_wp_pte() does this correctly via ptep_modify_prot_start() / ptep_modify_prot_commit(). Mirror that pattern for the present-PTE branch. The migration case stays as-is -- migration entries are non-present, so there's no hardware update to race against. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72171 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: slram: remove failed entries from the device list register_device() links a new slram_mtdlist entry before allocating all of the state needed by the entry. If a later allocation, memremap(), or mtd_device_register() fails, the partially initialized entry remains on the global list. A later cleanup can then dereference or free invalid state from that failed entry. Unwind the partially initialized entry and clear the list tail on each failure path after the entry has been linked. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72170 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 9p: skip nlink update in cacheless mode to fix WARN_ON v9fs_dec_count() unconditionally calls drop_nlink() on regular files, even when the inode's nlink is already zero. In cacheless mode the client refetches inode metadata from the server (the source of truth) on every operation, so by the time v9fs_remove() returns, the locally cached nlink may already reflect the post-unlink value: 1. Client initiates unlink, server processes it and sets nlink to 0 2. Client refetches inode metadata (nlink=0) before unlink returns 3. Client's v9fs_remove() completes successfully 4. Client calls v9fs_dec_count() which calls drop_nlink() on nlink=0 This race is easily triggered under heavy unlink workloads, such as stress-ng's unlink stressor, producing the following warning: WARNING: fs/inode.c:417 at drop_nlink+0x4c/0xc8 Call trace: drop_nlink+0x4c/0xc8 v9fs_remove+0x1e0/0x250 [9p] v9fs_vfs_unlink+0x20/0x38 [9p] vfs_unlink+0x13c/0x258 ... In cacheless mode the server is authoritative and the inode is on its way out, so locally adjusting nlink buys nothing. Skip v9fs_dec_count() entirely when neither CACHE_META nor CACHE_LOOSE is set, which both avoids the warning and removes a class of nlink races (two concurrent unlinkers observing nlink > 0 and both calling drop_nlink()) that an nlink == 0 guard alone would only narrow rather than close. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72164 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: avoid moving extents to occupied clusters For non-auto OCFS2_IOC_MOVE_EXT operations, userspace supplies a physical me_goal. ocfs2_move_extent() initializes new_phys_cpos from that goal and expects ocfs2_probe_alloc_group() to replace it with a free run in the target block group. The probe currently leaves *phys_cpos unchanged if the scan reaches the end of the group without finding a free run. An occupied goal at the last bit can therefore survive the probe and be passed to __ocfs2_move_extent(), which copies file data into a cluster still owned by another inode before the bitmap is updated. When the probe does find a free run, it also subtracts move_len from the ending bit. The start of an N-bit run ending at i is i - N + 1, so the current calculation can report the bit immediately before the free run. Clear *phys_cpos before scanning and use the correct free-run start. Callers already treat a zero result as -ENOSPC, so failed probes no longer continue with an occupied caller-controlled goal. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72162 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix UBSAN array-index-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_sum_rightmost_rec [BUG] On-disk corruption setting l_next_free_rec to 0 in an inode's embedded extent list triggers a UBSAN panic on the next write to that file. [CAUSE] ocfs2_sum_rightmost_rec() computes i = le16_to_cpu(el->l_next_free_rec) - 1 and accesses el->l_recs[i] without validating i. When l_next_free_rec is 0, i becomes -1; when l_next_free_rec exceeds l_count, i falls past the end of the array. Either case violates the __counted_by_le(l_count) annotation on l_recs[] and triggers UBSAN. [FIX] Validate the inode's embedded extent list when the inode is read, in ocfs2_validate_inode_block(): l_count must be non-zero and no larger than the inode block can hold, and l_next_free_rec must not exceed l_count. A corrupt list is rejected at read time, before the b-tree code can index l_recs[] out of bounds. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72160 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: reject dinodes with non-canonical i_mode type Patch series "ocfs2: harden inode validators against forged metadata", v2. This series adds three structural checks to OCFS2 dinode validation so malformed on-disk fields are rejected before ocfs2_populate_inode() copies them into the in-core inode. The checks cover: - i_mode values whose type bits do not name a canonical POSIX file type; - non-device dinodes whose id1.dev1.i_rdev field is non-zero; and - non-inline dinodes that claim non-zero i_size while i_clusters is zero, covering directories unconditionally and regular files on non-sparse volumes. The normal read path reports these through ocfs2_error(), matching the existing suballoc-slot, inline-data, chain-list, and refcount checks. The online filecheck path uses the same structural predicates but keeps its own reporting contract, returning OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead of calling ocfs2_error(). This patch (of 3): ocfs2_validate_inode_block() currently accepts any non-zero i_mode value. ocfs2_populate_inode() then copies that mode verbatim into inode->i_mode and dispatches on i_mode & S_IFMT to the file/dir/symlink/special_file iops; an unrecognised type falls through to ocfs2_special_file_iops and init_special_inode(). Reject dinodes whose type bits do not name one of the seven canonical POSIX file types. Use fs_umode_to_ftype(), the same generic file-type conversion helper OCFS2 already uses for directory entries, so the accepted inode type set matches the kernel file-type vocabulary instead of open-coding a local switch. Apply the same structural check to the online filecheck read path. filecheck keeps its own error namespace, so it reports malformed i_mode through the filecheck logger and OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead of calling ocfs2_error(), but it must not allow a malformed dinode to proceed into ocfs2_populate_inode(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72157 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: thunderbolt: Fix frags[] overflow by bounding frame_count tbnet_poll() assembles a multi-frame ThunderboltIP packet into one skb. The first frame goes into the skb linear area and every further frame is added as a page fragment. skb_add_rx_frag(skb, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags, page, hdr_size, frame_size, TBNET_RX_PAGE_SIZE - hdr_size); A packet of frame_count frames therefore ends up with frame_count - 1 fragments. tbnet_check_frame() only bounds the peer supplied frame_count to TBNET_RING_SIZE / 4 (64), which is far above MAX_SKB_FRAGS (17 by default). A peer that sends a packet of 19 or more small frames pushes nr_frags past MAX_SKB_FRAGS, so skb_add_rx_frag() writes past skb_shinfo()->frags[] and corrupts memory after the shared info. Tighten the start of packet bound to MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1 so a packet can never produce more fragments than frags[] can hold. This matches the recent skb frags overflow fixes in other receive paths, for example f0813bcd2d9d ("net: wwan: t7xx: fix potential skb->frags overflow in RX path") and 600dc40554dc ("net: usb: cdc-phonet: fix skb frags[] overflow in rx_complete()"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72151 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tpm: tpm2-sessions: wait for async KPP completion in tpm_buf_append_salt tpm_buf_append_salt() in drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c calls crypto_kpp_generate_public_key() and crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret() without installing a completion callback, discards both return values, and immediately frees the kpp_request via kpp_request_free(). When the resolved ecdh-nist-p256 KPP backend is asynchronous (atmel-ecc, HPRE, keembay-ocs), either operation returns -EINPROGRESS and the deferred completion worker dereferences the freed request. The path fires automatically from the hwrng_fillfn kernel thread via tpm_get_random -> tpm2_get_random -> tpm2_start_auth_session -> tpm_buf_append_salt on every entropy poll, without any userland action. Install crypto_req_done as the completion callback, wrap both KPP operations in crypto_wait_req(), and propagate errors to the caller. The wait is a no-op for synchronous backends. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72149 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: tegra: Fix burst size calculation Currently, the Tegra GPC DMA hardware requires the transfer length to be a multiple of the max burst size configured for the channel. When a client requests a transfer where the length is not evenly divisible by the configured max burst size, the DMA hangs with partial burst at the end. Fix this by reducing the burst size to the largest power-of-2 value that evenly divides the transfer length. For example, a 40-byte transfer with a 16-byte max burst will now use an 8-byte burst (40 / 8 = 5 complete bursts) instead of causing a hang. This issue was observed with the PL011 UART driver where TX DMA transfers of arbitrary lengths were stuck. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72148 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: dw-edma: Add spinlock to protect DONE_INT_MASK and ABORT_INT_MASK The DONE_INT_MASK and ABORT_INT_MASK registers are shared by all DMA channels, and modifying them requires a read-modify-write sequence. Because this operation is not atomic, concurrent calls to dw_edma_v0_core_start() can introduce race conditions if two channels update these registers simultaneously. Add a spinlock to serialize access to these registers and prevent race conditions. [den: update dw_edma.lock comment] | ||||
| CVE-2026-72144 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: dell-laptop: fix missing cleanups in init error path dell_init() initializes several resources after dell_setup_rfkill(), including the optional touchpad LED, keyboard backlight LED, battery hook, debugfs directory and dell-laptop notifier. If a later LED or backlight registration fails, the error path only tears down the battery hook and rfkill resources. This leaves the notifier, debugfs directory, keyboard backlight LED and optional touchpad LED registered after dell_init() returns an error. Add the missing cleanup calls before tearing down rfkill. | ||||