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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-72165 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: rawnand: fix condition in 'nand_select_target()' 'cs' here must be in range [0:nanddev_ntargets[. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72166 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/9p: fix infinite loop in p9_client_rpc on fatal signal When p9_client_rpc() is called with type P9_TFLUSH and the transport has no peer (e.g. fd transport backed by pipes with no 9p server), a fatal signal causes an infinite loop: again: err = io_wait_event_killable(req->wq, ...) /* SIGKILL wakes the task, returns -ERESTARTSYS */ if (err == -ERESTARTSYS && c->status == Connected && type == P9_TFLUSH) { sigpending = 1; clear_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING); goto again; } clear_thread_flag() clears TIF_SIGPENDING before jumping back to io_wait_event_killable(). signal_pending_state() checks TIF_SIGPENDING, finds it zero, and the task goes to sleep again. The task can only wake on the next signal delivery that calls signal_wake_up() and sets TIF_SIGPENDING again. When that happens the loop repeats, clears TIF_SIGPENDING, and sleeps again indefinitely. This is triggered in practice by coredump_wait(): when a thread in a multi-threaded process causes a coredump (e.g. via SIGSYS from Syscall User Dispatch), coredump_wait() sends SIGKILL to all other threads and waits for them to call mm_release(). If one of those threads is blocked in p9_client_rpc() over an fd transport with no peer, it enters the P9_TFLUSH loop and never calls mm_release(), so coredump_wait() stalls forever: INFO: task syz.0.18:676 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Not tainted 6.12.77+ #1 task:syz.0.18 state:D stack:27600 pid:676 tgid:673 ppid:630 flags:0x00000004 Call Trace: <TASK> context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5344 [inline] __schedule+0xcb4/0x5d50 kernel/sched/core.c:6724 __schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6801 [inline] schedule+0xe5/0x350 kernel/sched/core.c:6816 schedule_timeout+0x253/0x290 kernel/time/timer.c:2593 do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:95 [inline] __wait_for_common+0x409/0x600 kernel/sched/completion.c:116 wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:127 [inline] wait_for_completion_state+0x1d/0x40 kernel/sched/completion.c:264 coredump_wait fs/coredump.c:448 [inline] do_coredump+0x854/0x4350 fs/coredump.c:629 get_signal+0x1425/0x2730 kernel/signal.c:2903 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x81/0x880 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xf9/0x160 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0x102/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:84 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Fix: check fatal_signal_pending() before clearing TIF_SIGPENDING in the P9_TFLUSH retry loop. At that point TIF_SIGPENDING is still set, so fatal_signal_pending() works correctly. If a fatal signal is pending, jump to recalc_sigpending to restore TIF_SIGPENDING and return -ERESTARTSYS to the caller. The same defect is present in stable kernels back to 5.4. On those kernels the infinite loop is broken earlier by a second SIGKILL from the parent process (e.g. kill_and_wait() retrying after a timeout), resulting in a zombie process and a shutdown delay rather than a permanent D-state hang, but the underlying flaw is the same. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72172 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mm_init: fix uninitialized struct pages for ZONE_DEVICE If DAX memory is hotplugged into an unoccupied subsection of an early section, section_activate() reuses the unoptimized boot memmap. However, compound_nr_pages() still assumes that vmemmap optimization is in effect and initializes only the reduced number of struct pages. As a result, the remaining tail struct pages are left uninitialized, which can later lead to unexpected behavior or crashes. Fix this by treating early sections as unoptimized when calculating how many struct pages to initialize. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72175 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/proc/task_mmu: fix make_uffd_wp_huge_pte() prot-update race Patch series "userfaultfd/pagemap: pre-existing fixes". These are pre-existing bug fixes that were carried at the front of the userfaultfd RWP working-set-tracking series up to v5 [1]. Per review feedback that fixes should not sit in the middle of a feature series, they are split out and sent on their own; the RWP series is reposted rebased on top of this. All six were flagged by the Sashiko AI review of the RWP series and carry independent of RWP, apply to mm-new directly, and carry Cc: stable@. 1: fs/proc/task_mmu: a missing huge_ptep_modify_prot_start() in make_uffd_wp_huge_pte() can lose hardware Dirty/Accessed updates when PAGEMAP_SCAN write-protects a hugetlb PTE. 2: fs/proc/task_mmu: pagemap_scan_hugetlb_entry() compares the range against HPAGE_SIZE rather than the hstate page size, so it never write-protects gigantic hugetlb pages. 3: fs/proc/task_mmu: PAGEMAP_SCAN with PM_SCAN_WP_MATCHING over an unpopulated hugetlb range self-deadlocks -- pagemap_scan_pte_hole() calls uffd_wp_range() while walk_hugetlb_range() holds the hugetlb vma lock for read, and hugetlb_change_protection() then takes it for write. Install the marker inline instead. 4: mm/huge_memory: change_non_present_huge_pmd() drops pmd_swp_uffd_wp on a device-private PMD permission downgrade, silently losing the uffd-wp marker. 5: userfaultfd: must_wait() applies pte_write() to a locklessly read PTE without checking pte_present(), so swap/migration entries decode random offset bits and a thread can stay parked on a stale fault. 6: userfaultfd: __VMA_UFFD_FLAGS feeds VMA_UFFD_MINOR_BIT (41) to mk_vma_flags() unconditionally, an out-of-bounds write into the single-word vma_flags_t on 32-bit. Build the mask from config-gated per-mode masks so an unavailable bit is never materialised. This patch (of 6): make_uffd_wp_huge_pte() arms the UFFD_WP bit on a present HugeTLB PTE by calling huge_ptep_modify_prot_commit() with a ptent snapshot that was fetched without the corresponding huge_ptep_modify_prot_start(). The start helper is what atomically clears the entry so the kernel-owned snapshot stays consistent until the commit; without it, the hardware may set Dirty or Accessed in the live PTE between the original read and the commit, and huge_ptep_modify_prot_commit() (whose generic implementation just calls set_huge_pte_at()) then writes the stale snapshot back over the live hardware bits, losing the update. The non-hugetlb sibling make_uffd_wp_pte() does this correctly via ptep_modify_prot_start() / ptep_modify_prot_commit(). Mirror that pattern for the present-PTE branch. The migration case stays as-is -- migration entries are non-present, so there's no hardware update to race against. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72177 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: fix dir put orders in access_pattern_add_dirs() Patch series "mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: fix wrong directories put orders in error paths". Error paths of damon_sysfs_access_pattern_add_dirs() and damon_sysfs_scheme_add_dirs() functions put references to directories in wrong orders. As a result, uninitialized memory dereference and/or memory leak can happen. Fix those. This patch (of 2): In access_pattern_add_dirs(), error handling path puts references starting from setup failed directories. If the failure happpened from the initial allication in the setup functions, uninitialized memory dereference happen. The allocation failures will not commonly happen, but the consequence is quite bad. Fix the wrong reference put orders. The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72180 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/huge_memory: preserve pmd_swp_uffd_wp on device-private PMD downgrade change_non_present_huge_pmd() rewrites a writable device-private PMD swap entry into a readable one without carrying pmd_swp_uffd_wp() across. The PTE-level change_softleaf_pte() does this correctly; mirror that here, matching what copy_huge_pmd() does for the fork path. Without the carry, a plain mprotect() over a UFFD_WP-marked device-private THP strips the bit and the trap is bypassed on swap-in. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72191 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: validate split-point offset in indx_insert_into_buffer indx_insert_into_buffer() computes used = used1 - to_copy - sp_size; memmove(de_t, Add2Ptr(sp, sp_size), used - le32_to_cpu(hdr1->de_off)); where sp and sp_size come from hdr_find_split(). hdr_find_split() walks entries by le16_to_cpu(e->size) without validating that each step stays within hdr->used or that the size field is at least sizeof(struct NTFS_DE). index_hdr_check(), the on-load gatekeeper, only validates header-level fields (used, total, de_off) and does not walk per-entry sizes. A crafted NTFS image whose leaf INDEX_HDR reports used == total but contains one interior NTFS_DE with size = 0xFFF0 therefore passes validation, descends to indx_insert_into_buffer() through the ntfs_create() -> indx_insert_entry() path, and makes hdr_find_split() return an sp whose sp_size (0xFFF0) greatly exceeds the remaining bytes in the buffer. The u32 subtraction underflows and the memmove count becomes a near-4-GiB value, producing an out-of-bounds kernel write that corrupts adjacent allocations and panics the kernel. Reproduced on 7.0.0-rc7 with UML + KASAN via a crafted image and a single 'touch' inside the mounted directory; crash site resolves to fs/ntfs3/index.c at the memmove. Trigger requires only local mount of an attacker-supplied filesystem image (USB, loopback, or removable media auto-mount). Reject the split whenever the chosen sp plus its declared size already extends past hdr1->used. This is the minimal fix; it preserves the existing hdr_find_split() contract and relies on the same out: cleanup path as the pre-existing error returns. A prior OOB read in the very same indx_insert_into_buffer() memmove was fixed in commit b8c44949044e ("fs/ntfs3: Fix OOB read in indx_insert_into_buffer") by tightening hdr_find_e(), but that fix does not cover the split-point size field path addressed here: sp is returned by hdr_find_split(), not hdr_find_e(), and the underflow is driven by sp->size rather than hdr->used exceeding hdr->total. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72204 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: centalize $INDEX_ROOT header validation Add a dedicated helper to perform stricter validation of $INDEX_ROOT and use it for both directory inodes and named index inodes. This keeps the root size and header geometry checks consistent across both read paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72206 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: validate index block header more strictly Modify ntfs_index_block_inconsisent() to perform stricter validation of INDEX_HEADER geometry in INDX blocks, and update ntfs_lookup_inode_by_name() to use that function to validate INDX blocks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72224 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvdimm/btt: Free arenas on btt_init() error paths The arenas allocated by discover_arenas() or create_arenas() are not freed on some error paths in btt_init(). This leaks memory when BTT initialization fails. Call free_arenas() from the affected error paths to release the allocations. [ as: commit message and log edits ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-72240 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mfd: sm501: Fix reference leak on failed device registration When platform_device_register() fails in sm501_register_device(), the embedded struct device in pdev has already been initialized by device_initialize(), but the failure path only reports the error and returns without dropping the device reference for the current platform device: sm501_register_device() -> platform_device_register(pdev) -> device_initialize(&pdev->dev) -> setup_pdev_dma_masks(pdev) -> platform_device_add(pdev) This leads to a reference leak when platform_device_register() fails. Fix this by calling platform_device_put() before returning the error. The issue was identified by a static analysis tool I developed and confirmed by manual review. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72192 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: bound to_move in indx_insert_into_root before hdr_insert_head indx_insert_into_root() promotes a full resident $INDEX_ROOT into $INDEX_ALLOCATION and copies all non-last resident root entries into a newly allocated INDEX_BUFFER via hdr_insert_head(). The source byte count 'to_move' is summed from the on-disk resident entry sizes and is independent of the destination buffer size, which comes from root->index_block_size (via indx->index_bits). A crafted NTFS image that keeps a valid, full resident root but shrinks root->index_block_size down to 512 after the root has been populated makes hdr_insert_head() memcpy attacker-controlled resident entry bytes past the end of the kmalloc(1u << indx->index_bits) allocation returned by indx_new(). For a 512-byte destination and a resident root whose non-last entries total 560 bytes, the memcpy overruns by 120 bytes and a following memmove extends the highest written offset to 136 bytes past the allocation. The overflow bytes are a direct copy of on-disk entries (via kmemdup), so they are fully attacker-controlled. The write is reachable from unprivileged open(O_CREAT) on a mounted crafted NTFS image: a single sufficiently long create in a directory whose resident root is already full forces root promotion and triggers the copy. This is a controlled out-of-bounds write of 120-136 bytes past a kmalloc(index_block_size) allocation, with attacker-controlled content. It is a bounded adjacent-heap corruption primitive; it is not an arbitrary-address write. Successful exploitation into a named victim object depends on the surrounding slab layout. Reject the copy at the sink. The destination's INDEX_HDR already reports hdr_total (the payload capacity of the new buffer) and hdr_used (the bytes already consumed by the terminal END entry installed by indx_new()); require that to_move fits in the remaining payload before calling hdr_insert_head(). On mismatch, fail with -EINVAL and mark the filesystem as having a detected on-disk inconsistency, which is the same behaviour as the surrounding validation in this function. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72193 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: cap RESTART_TABLE free-chain walker at rt->used A crafted NTFS3 disk image triggers an in-kernel infinite loop at mount time, hanging the mounting thread and firing the soft-lockup watchdog within ~22s on multi-CPU hosts (panic with kernel.softlockup_panic=1). The bug is reachable from desktop USB auto-mount on distributions where udisks2 routes the NTFS signature to the in-tree ntfs3 driver (Arch family and an increasing fraction of Fedora / openSUSE / RHEL deployments); CAP_SYS_ADMIN-class manual mount elsewhere. check_rstbl()'s second walker iterates the free-entry singly-linked list headed by rt->first_free with no upper bound on iteration count: for (off = ff; off;) { if (off == RESTART_ENTRY_ALLOCATED) return false; off = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)Add2Ptr(rt, off)); if (off > ts - sizeof(__le32)) return false; } The existing guards cover three exits: end-of-list (off == 0), the in-use marker (off == RESTART_ENTRY_ALLOCATED), and out-of-bounds (off > ts - sizeof(__le32)). None of the three prevents an in-bounds cycle. A crafted on-disk RESTART_TABLE whose free chain contains a self-loop or A->B->A cycle whose offsets satisfy: - in range [sizeof(struct RESTART_TABLE), ts - sizeof(__le32)] - (off - sizeof(struct RESTART_TABLE)) % rsize == 0 passes all existing guards and spins the mount-time thread forever. Reproduced in UML by hand-forging a 2 MB NTFS3 image whose journal RESTART_TABLE first_free = 0x18 and whose entry at offset 0x18 stores 0x18 as its next pointer; mount of the forged image with the in-tree ntfs3 driver never returns. Bound the walker by rt->used. Each entry on a legitimate free chain is unique, and the total slot count is ne = le16_to_cpu (rt->used). A traversal that visits more than ne slots is by construction malformed; reject it as a corrupt RESTART_TABLE. After this patch, mount of the forged image returns with -EINVAL and a log_replay failure message, and mkntfs-produced legitimate images mount cleanly (verified in the same UML harness). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72194 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: add depth limit to indx_find_buffer to prevent stack overflow indx_find_buffer() recursively descends the B+ tree index with no depth limit. A crafted NTFS image with circular index node references causes unbounded recursion, overflowing the kernel stack and panicking the system. This is reachable by mounting a malicious NTFS filesystem (e.g. from a USB drive via desktop automount) and deleting a file whose index entry triggers the rebalancing fallback path in indx_delete_entry(). Add a depth parameter and bail out with -EINVAL when it reaches the fnd->nodes array bound, matching the constraint already enforced by fnd_push() in indx_find(). The related function indx_find() was previously patched for a similar infinite-loop issue (commit 1732053c8a6b), but indx_find_buffer() was missed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72195 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: bound attr_off in UpdateResidentValue against data_off In do_action()'s UpdateResidentValue case (fslog.c:3307), lrh->attr_off and lrh->redo_len come from the on-disk LRH. When they satisfy aoff + dlen < attr->res.data_off, the assignment attr->res.data_size = cpu_to_le32(aoff + dlen - data_off); underflows to ~4 GiB (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9 when aoff=0x10, dlen=1, data_off=0x18). Subsequent code that reads attr->res.data_size to walk the resident attribute payload would then read up to 4 GiB past the 1024-byte MFT record allocation. The existing mi_enum_attr() defense in fs/ntfs3/record.c:287 catches the corrupted data_size on the next attribute walk and fails the mount, but only on the path that walks all attributes. A read site that picks an attribute by name and reads its data_size without re-validating is not covered. Validate aoff against data_off and asize at the source. Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 via pr_warn-only probe: with aoff=0x10 and data_off=0x18, the post-assignment data_size is 0xfffffff9 (mount then fails at -22 from mi_enum_attr). [almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes] | ||||
| CVE-2026-72197 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: bound DeleteIndexEntryAllocation memmove length In do_action()'s DeleteIndexEntryAllocation case, e->size comes from an on-disk INDEX_BUFFER entry. When e->size makes e + e->size point past hdr + hdr->used, PtrOffset(e1, Add2Ptr(hdr, used)) returns a negative ptrdiff_t that is silently cast to a quasi-infinite size_t when passed to memmove(). The memmove then walks past the destination buffer. The sibling DeleteIndexEntryRoot case at fslog.c:3540-3543 already carries the corresponding guard: if (PtrOffset(e1, Add2Ptr(hdr, used)) < esize || Add2Ptr(e, esize) > Add2Ptr(lrh, rec_len) || used + esize > le32_to_cpu(hdr->total)) { goto dirty_vol; } Apply the same shape to the allocation-path case. Also reject esize == 0: memmove(e, e, ...) is a no-op and leaves hdr->used unchanged, hiding a malformed entry from the existing check_index_header() walk. Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 by mounting a crafted NTFS image: the unguarded memmove takes a length of 0xffffffffffffff00 and the kernel oopses in memmove+0x81/0x1a0 on the do_action+0x36a2 frame. [almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes] | ||||
| CVE-2026-72205 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: free volume-wide resources on fill_super failure ntfs_fill_super()'s err_out_now path frees only the volume struct via kfree(vol), leaving several vol-owned allocations behind on every mount failure: - vol->nls_map, loaded by ntfs_init_fs_context() via load_nls_default() (or replaced by an explicit nls= option in ntfs_parse_param()), is never unload_nls()'d. - vol->volume_label, allocated by load_system_files() through ntfs_ucstonls() once the $Volume name attribute has been parsed, is not released by load_system_files()'s own error labels nor by the fill_super() inline cleanup that only runs on d_make_root() failure. Any later failure inside load_system_files() leaks it. - vol->lcn_empty_bits_per_page was kvfree()'d in unl_upcase_iput_tmp_ino_err_out_now without clearing the pointer, so it could not be folded into a single common cleanup. Because the failure paths never call ntfs_volume_free() and never reach the d_make_root() inline cleanup block (it sits above the label and is jumped over by the load_system_files() / kvmalloc failure gotos), these resources accumulate per failed mount attempt with no chance of recovery short of unloading the module. This is a silent leak: the inodes loaded prior to failure remain hashed but generic_shutdown_super() skips evict_inodes() when sb->s_root is unset, so no CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION warning is emitted either. Move the per-volume frees down to err_out_now and drop the lcn_empty_bits_per_page kvfree() from the upper label so the cleanup is performed exactly once on every failure path. Using unconditional kvfree() / kfree() / unload_nls() is safe because they all accept NULL and the upper labels that previously freed nls_map (the d_make_root() inline cleanup) already clear the pointer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72209 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: validate attribute values on lookup ntfs_attr_find() and ntfs_external_attr_find() check that generic resident attribute values fit in their attribute records and that fixed-size resident values are large enough. For variable-length resident formats, however, the fixed part is not enough: embedded length fields can still point callers past the resident value. A crafted image can set a small resident $FILE_NAME value_length while leaving file_name_length large. Callers then trust file_name_length and read past the resident value when converting or comparing the name. This was reproduced with a crafted image under KASAN as a slab-out-of-bounds read from the kmalloc-1k MFT record copy. The stack included ntfs_lookup(), ntfs_iget(), ntfs_read_locked_inode(), ntfs_attr_name_get(), ntfs_ucstonls(), and utf16s_to_utf8s(). Add a shared attribute value validator and use it before a lookup path can return an attribute, including the AT_UNUSED enumeration case where callers inspect returned attributes directly. The helper validates resident value bounds, minimum resident value sizes, variable-length $FILE_NAME fields, and non-resident mapping-pairs metadata that was previously checked separately in both lookup paths. This also preserves the intended resident @val matching semantics in the external attribute lookup path. The old duplicated validation block overwrote the actual resident value length with the type-specific minimum length before comparing @val, so variable-length resident values could fail to match even when the bytes were identical. Keep the comparison on the actual value length, and make ntfs_attrlist_entry_add() compare resident attributes with lowest_vcn zero instead of reading the non-resident union member after a successful resident match. Reject non-resident $FILE_NAME records too: the format requires $FILE_NAME to be resident and callers treat returned records as resident. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72210 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the end of the attribute record: attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr->length); The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within the attribute use strict greater-than (>), which allows a one-byte out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end: b = *buf & 0xf; if (b) { if (unlikely(buf + b > attr_end)) // off-by-one goto io_error; for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--) deltaxcn = (deltaxcn << 8) + buf[b]; } When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in the LCN delta bytes check. Fix both checks to use >= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is correctly rejected as out of bounds. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72212 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/memory_hotplug: fix incorrect altmap passing in error path In create_altmaps_and_memory_blocks(), when arch_add_memory() succeeds with memmap_on_memory enabled, the vmemmap pages are allocated from params.altmap. If create_memory_block_devices() subsequently fails, the error path calls arch_remove_memory() with a NULL altmap instead of params.altmap. This is a bug that could lead to memory corruption. Since altmap is NULL, vmemmap_free() falls back to freeing the vmemmap pages into the system buddy allocator via free_pages() instead of the altmap. arch_remove_memory() then immediately destroys the physical linear mapping for this memory. This injects unowned pages into the buddy allocator, causing machine checks or memory corruption if the system later attempts to allocate and use those freed pages. Fix this by passing params.altmap to arch_remove_memory() in the error path. | ||||