| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in gnutls. An off-by-one error exists in the PKCS#12 bag element bounds check. This vulnerability allows an remote attacker to write past the internal array of a PKCS#12 bag when appending to a bag that already contains 32 elements. This memory corruption could lead to a denial of service (DoS) or potentially other unspecified impacts. |
| In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.13.2 up to and including 1.25.1, stub or forward zones where the name is below an intermediate labed below a DNSSEC signed zone could be shadowed by the intermediate label's secure NXDOMAIN answer from the parent. This is caused by an off-by-one error in 'harden-below-nxdomain' logic; enabled by default. It effectively bypasses the configuration and the configured stub/forward zone is never contacted. 'harden-below-nxdomain' does an upward DNS cache walk together with a delegation point guard that does not allow NXDOMAIN synthesis above stub/forward zones. The guard tests the domain name but before stripping a label. This results in an iteration where the domain name equals the configured stub/forward zone apex that passes the guard, strips one more label, and probes the cache at the apex's immediate public parent. If that parent has a cached DNSSEC-secure NXDOMAIN, which it will for any private namespace nested two or more labels under a signed public name, the walk returns it and the configured stub/forward upstream is never contacted. This can only be triggered by the query for the intermediate label (between the stub/forward apex and the DNSSEC parent zone). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: Reject MPA FPDU length underflow before signed receive math
A malicious connected siw peer can send an iWARP FPDU whose MPA length
field (c_hdr->mpa_len, 16 bit big-endian, peer-controlled) is smaller
than the fixed DDP/RDMAP header for the announced opcode. Soft-iWARP
parses the full header in siw_get_hdr() based on iwarp_pktinfo[opcode]
.hdr_len, but never compares mpa_len against that header length.
siw_tcp_rx_data() then derives
srx->fpdu_part_rem = be16_to_cpu(mpa_len) - fpdu_part_rcvd
+ MPA_HDR_SIZE;
where fpdu_part_rcvd equals iwarp_pktinfo[opcode].hdr_len at this
point. For a tagged WRITE (hdr_len 16, MPA_HDR_SIZE 2) the smallest
on-wire mpa_len of 0 yields fpdu_part_rem = -14, and any mpa_len below
hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE underflows to a negative int.
The signed value then flows into siw_proc_write()/siw_proc_rresp() as
bytes = min(srx->fpdu_part_rem, srx->skb_new);
is handed to siw_check_mem() as an int len (whose interval check
addr + len > mem->va + mem->len is satisfied for a valid base when
len is negative), and reaches siw_rx_data() -> siw_rx_kva() /
siw_rx_umem() -> skb_copy_bits() as a signed copy length. The header
copy branch in skb_copy_bits() promotes that to size_t, producing a
multi-gigabyte read.
KASAN under a KUnit harness that drives the real kernel TCP receive
path -- a loopback AF_INET socketpair, the malformed FPDU written via
kernel_sendmsg, sk_data_ready firing in softirq, tcp_read_sock
dispatching to siw_tcp_rx_data -- reports:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_copy_bits+0x284/0x480
Read of size 4294967295 at addr ffff888...
Call Trace:
skb_copy_bits
siw_rx_kva
siw_rx_data
siw_check_mem
siw_proc_write
siw_tcp_rx_data
__tcp_read_sock
siw_qp_llp_data_ready
tcp_data_ready
tcp_data_queue
Add the missing invariant at the earliest point where the peer header
is fully assembled. iwarp_pktinfo[*].hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE is exactly
the value the siw transmitter uses as the minimum mpa_len for each
opcode (drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp.c:33), so this matches the
protocol contract. Out-of-range FPDUs terminate the connection with
TERM_ERROR_LAYER_LLP / LLP_ETYPE_MPA / LLP_ECODE_FPDU_START -- which
is RFC 5044 Section 8 error code 3 ("Marker and ULPDU Length fields
do not agree on the start of an FPDU"), the correct framing-error
class for this inconsistency. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: tls: fix off-by-one in sg_chain entry count for wrapped sk_msg ring
When an sk_msg scatterlist ring wraps (sg.end < sg.start),
tls_push_record() chains the tail portion of the ring to the head
using sg_chain(). An extra entry in the sg array is reserved for
this:
struct sk_msg_sg {
[...]
/* The extra two elements:
* 1) used for chaining the front and sections when the list becomes
* partitioned (e.g. end < start). The crypto APIs require the
* chaining;
* 2) to chain tailer SG entries after the message.
*/
struct scatterlist data[MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 2];
The current code uses MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1 as the ring size:
sg_chain(&msg_pl->sg.data[msg_pl->sg.start],
MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_pl->sg.start + 1,
msg_pl->sg.data);
This places the chain pointer at
sg_chain(data[start], (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) .. =
&data[start] + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) - 1 =
data[start + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - start + 1) - 1] =
data[MAX_SKB_FRAGS]
instead of the true last entry. This is likely due to a "race" of
the commit under Fixes landing close to
commit 031097d9e079 ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down")
Convert to ARRAY_SIZE and drop the data[start] / - start (as suggested
by Sabrina). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
misc: fastrpc: fix DMA address corruption due to find_vma misuse
fastrpc_get_args() uses find_vma() to look up the VMA for a user-provided
pointer and compute a DMA address offset. When the address falls in a gap
before the returned VMA, (ptr & PAGE_MASK) - vma->vm_start underflows,
corrupting the DMA address sent to the DSP.
Replace find_vma() with vma_lookup(), which returns NULL when the address
is not contained within any VMA. |
| A flaw was found in GIMP's PNM file format parser. When parsing a specially crafted PNM file, the pnmscanner_gettoken() function writes a null terminator one byte past the end of a stack-allocated buffer due to an off-by-one error in the loop boundary check. This could lead to memory corruption, potentially resulting in denial of service or arbitrary code execution. |
| Off-by-one error in Windows Remote Desktop Protocol allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| An invalidly formatted IKEv2 fragment causes the Libreswan pluto daemon to crash and restart. Continued exploitation would cause a denial of service. The function reassemble_v2_incoming_fragments() would ignore unknown outer payloads but still store these in a fixed size array msg_digest.digest[PAYLIMIT]. An off-by-one error in the assertion PASSERT(logger, md->digest_roof < elemsof(md->digest)) causes the daemon to abort. No remote code execution is possible. Any configuration that allows IKEv2 connections that do not set fragmentation=no are vulnerable. IKEv1 is not affected. |
| UltraVNC repeater through 1.8.2.2 contains an off-by-one error in the Base64 decode helper used for HTTP Basic authentication. In repeater/webgui/webutils.c:817, the wi_uudecode() function checks whether the input length exceeds the output buffer with a strict greater-than comparison (>), while the correct check should be greater-than-or-equal (>=). When strlen(authdata) equals sizeof(decode), the decoded output length (approximately 3/4 of input) does not overflow the buffer in current practice because the outer HTTP request bounds constrain the Authorization header. However, the defective check leaves a latent off-by-one condition that could become exploitable if the buffering constraints change. The current risk is limited to a one-byte write at the boundary of a 1024-byte stack buffer under constrained conditions. |
| UltraVNC viewer through 1.8.2.2 contains an off-by-one stack buffer overflow in the RFB ServerInit message handler. In vncviewer/ClientConnection.cpp, when the server-supplied nameLength equals exactly 2024 the code declares a 2024-byte stack buffer _dn[2024] and calls ReadString(_dn, 2024). ReadString writes the NUL terminator at buf[length], i.e., _dn[2024], one byte past the end of the stack buffer. A malicious VNC server can trigger this condition by advertising a desktop name of length 2024 in its ServerInit message. On release builds without stack canaries the single-byte NUL overwrite adjacent stack data. On builds with /GS stack protection the canary is corrupted and the process terminates, resulting in denial of service. User interaction (connecting the viewer to the malicious server) is required. |
| A flaw was found in GLib. An off-by-one error can occur in the g_key_file_get_locale_string_list function in the gkeyfile.c file when loading a key file with an empty value. This flaw can cause an out-of-bounds access of 1 byte or a denial of service when the out-of-bounds access crosses a page boundary. |
| In hostapd before 2.12, a missing bounds check in AP-mode Wi-Fi 7 (IEEE 802.11be) Multi-Link Operation (MLO) association request processing allows an unauthenticated attacker within wireless range to send a crafted management frame containing a malformed Multi-Link Element or Per-STA Profile subelement. In hostapd_process_ml_assoc_req() in src/ap/ieee802_11_eht.c, the received link_id field can be parsed as value 15, but the corresponding links[] storage only has valid entries for lower link IDs (0 through 14). This causes an out-of-bounds write / small memory corruption during association processing before the 4-way handshake. The attack does not require network credentials, prior authentication, or user interaction. The confirmed practical impact is denial of service through hostapd process termination. This affects hostapd v2.11 and newer development snapshots before v2.12 when built with CONFIG_IEEE80211BE enabled. The issue is fixed in hostapd v2.12 and the upstream 2026-1 fixes. |
| A vulnerability has been identified in the libarchive library. This flaw involves an 'off-by-one' miscalculation when handling prefixes and suffixes for file names. This can lead to a 1-byte write overflow. While seemingly small, such an overflow can corrupt adjacent memory, leading to unpredictable program behavior, crashes, or in specific circumstances, could be leveraged as a building block for more sophisticated exploitation. This bug affects libarchive versions prior to 3.8.0. |
| There's a flaw in the nbdkit server when handling responses from its plugins regarding the status of data blocks. If a client makes a specific request for a very large data range, and a plugin responds with an even larger single block, the nbdkit server can encounter a critical internal error, leading to a denial-of-service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: hvc_iucv: fix off-by-one in number of supported devices
MAX_HVC_IUCV_LINES == HVC_ALLOC_TTY_ADAPTERS == 8.
This is the number of entries in:
static struct hvc_iucv_private *hvc_iucv_table[MAX_HVC_IUCV_LINES];
Sometimes hvc_iucv_table[] is limited by:
(a) if (num > hvc_iucv_devices) // for error detection
or
(b) for (i = 0; i < hvc_iucv_devices; i++) // in 2 places
(so these 2 don't agree; second one appears to be correct to me.)
hvc_iucv_devices can be 0..8. This is a counter.
(c) if (hvc_iucv_devices > MAX_HVC_IUCV_LINES)
If hvc_iucv_devices == 8, (a) allows the code to access hvc_iucv_table[8].
Oops. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bcmgenet: fix off-by-one in bcmgenet_put_txcb
The write_ptr points to the next open tx_cb. We want to return the
tx_cb that gets rewinded, so we must rewind the pointer first then
return the tx_cb that it points to. That way the txcb can be correctly
cleaned up. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Bounds-check devid in __rlookup_amd_iommu()
iommu_device_register() walks every device on the PCI bus via
bus_for_each_dev() and calls amd_iommu_probe_device() for each. The
inlined check_device() path computes the device's sbdf, calls
rlookup_amd_iommu() to find the owning IOMMU, and only afterwards
verifies devid <= pci_seg->last_bdf. __rlookup_amd_iommu() indexes
rlookup_table[devid] with no bounds check of its own, so for a PCI
device whose BDF is not described by the IVRS, the lookup reads past
the end of the allocation before the caller's bounds check can run.
This was harmless before commit e874c666b15b ("iommu/amd: Change
rlookup, irq_lookup, and alias to use kvalloc()"): the table was a
zeroed page-order allocation, so the over-read returned NULL and the
caller's NULL check skipped the device. After that commit the table is
a tight kvcalloc() and the over-read returns adjacent slab contents,
which check_device() then dereferences as a struct amd_iommu *,
causing a boot-time GPF.
Seen on Google Compute Engine ct6e VMs, where the virtualized IVRS
describes only the four TPU endpoints 00:04.0-07.0; the gVNIC at
00:08.0 (devid 0x40) indexes 56 bytes past the 456-byte allocation,
into the adjacent kmalloc-512 slab object:
pci 0000:00:04.0: Adding to iommu group 0
pci 0000:00:05.0: Adding to iommu group 1
pci 0000:00:06.0: Adding to iommu group 2
pci 0000:00:07.0: Adding to iommu group 3
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x3a64695f78746382: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.18.22 #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 12/06/2025
RIP: 0010:amd_iommu_probe_device+0x54/0x3a0
Call Trace:
__iommu_probe_device+0x107/0x520
probe_iommu_group+0x29/0x50
bus_for_each_dev+0x7e/0xe0
iommu_device_register+0xc9/0x240
iommu_go_to_state+0x9c0/0x1c60
amd_iommu_init+0x14/0x40
pci_iommu_init+0x16/0x60
do_one_initcall+0x47/0x2f0
Guard the array access in __rlookup_amd_iommu(). With the fix applied
on 6.18.22, the gVNIC at 00:08.0 is skipped cleanly and the VM boots. |
| CANBoat through 6.22, fixed in commit a5a22b7, contains an off-by-one global buffer overflow in the searchForPgn() function in analyzer/pgn.c that allows remote attackers to crash the application. Attackers can deliver a crafted NMEA-2000 message with an out-of-range PGN value over CAN bus or N2K-over-IP to trigger an out-of-bounds array access and denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
6lowpan: fix off-by-one in multicast context address compression
The second memcpy in lowpan_iphc_mcast_ctx_addr_compress() uses
&data[1] as destination and &ipaddr->s6_addr[11] as source, but
both should be offset by one: &data[2] and &ipaddr->s6_addr[12]
respectively.
This off-by-one has two consequences:
1. data[1] is overwritten with s6_addr[11], corrupting the RIID
field in the compressed multicast address
2. data[5] is never written, so uninitialized kernel stack memory
is transmitted over the network via lowpan_push_hc_data(),
leaking kernel stack contents
The correct inline data layout must match what the decompression
function lowpan_uncompress_multicast_ctx_daddr() expects:
data[0..1] = s6_addr[1..2] (flags/scope + RIID)
data[2..5] = s6_addr[12..15] (group ID)
Also zero-initialize the data array as a defensive measure against
similar bugs in the future. |
| RTKLIB through 2.4.3 contains an off-by-one out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the decode_ssr3 function at src/rtcm3.c:1446 that allows remote attackers to trigger a global buffer overflow via crafted RTCM3 SSR messages with attacker-controlled signal mode fields. Remote attackers can exploit this vulnerability by sending malicious SSR correction streams over NTRIP or serial connections to cause denial of service or crash RTKLIB rovers and CORS servers. |
