| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: reject overflowing copy + len in bpf_msg_push_data()
When the scatterlist ring is full or nearly full, bpf_msg_push_data()
enters a copy fallback path and computes copy + len for the page
allocation size. Since len comes from BPF with arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING
and both are u32, a crafted len can wrap the sum to a small value,
causing an undersized allocation followed by an out-of-bounds memcpy.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed104089a402
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
Call Trace:
__asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105)
bpf_msg_push_data (net/core/filter.c:2852 net/core/filter.c:2788)
bpf_prog_9ed8b5711920a7d7+0x2e/0x36
sk_psock_msg_verdict (net/core/skmsg.c:934)
tcp_bpf_sendmsg (net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:421 net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:584)
__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2206)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
Add an overflow check before the allocation. |
| An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed by removing the vulnerable code. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.6 and iPadOS 26.6, macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6, tvOS 26.6, visionOS 26.6, watchOS 26.6. Processing a maliciously crafted file may lead to unexpected app termination or arbitrary code execution. |
| An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6. An app may be able to access sensitive user data. |
| Out of bounds read in Layout in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Out of bounds read in Chromecast in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a local attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via malicious network traffic. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| In Modem, there is a possible memory corruption due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote escalation of privilege, if a UE has connected to a rogue base station controlled by the attacker, with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: MOLY01402160; Issue ID: MSV-7298. |
| NVIDIA ConnectX and BlueField contain a vulnerability in the command interface where a local user with virtual function (VF) access may cause a write out of bounds by crafted input. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to arbitrary code execution on the device. |
| NVIDIA ConnectX and BlueField contain a vulnerability in the command interface where a local user with virtual function (VF) access may cause a write out of bounds by crafted input. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to arbitrary code execution on the device. |
| Out of bounds write in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.46 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| A flaw has been found in davenardella snap7 up to 1.4.3. This affects the function TS7Worker::PerformFunctionRead of the file src/core/s7_server.cpp of the component ReadVar Request Handler. This manipulation causes out-of-bounds write. The attack requires access to the local network. The exploit has been published and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| A potential out-of-bounds write vulnerability could allow a local privileged attacker to modify power management settings in System Management Mode. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/statmount: fix slab out-of-bounds write in statmount_mnt_idmap
statmount_mnt_idmap() writes one mapping with seq_printf() and then
manually advances seq->count to include the NUL separator.
If seq_printf() overflows, seq_set_overflow() sets seq->count to
seq->size. The manual seq->count++ changes this to seq->size + 1.
seq_has_overflowed() then no longer detects the overflow. The corrupted
count returns to statmount_string(), which later executes:
seq->buf[seq->count++] = '\0';
This causes a 1-byte NULL out-of-bounds write on the dynamically
allocated seq buffer.
Fix this by checking for overflow immediately after seq_printf(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: qcom: qmp-usbc: Fix out-of-bounds array access in dp swing config
swing_tbl and pre_emphasis_tbl are 4x4 arrays (valid indices 0-3), but
the boundary check uses "> 4" instead of ">= 4", allowing index 4 to
cause an out-of-bounds access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: bound Read Response placement to the RREAD length
In drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp_rx.c, siw_proc_rresp() places each
inbound Read Response DDP segment at sge->laddr + wqe->processed and then
accumulates wqe->processed, but it never checks the running total against
the sink buffer length on continuation segments. siw_check_sge() resolves
and validates the sink memory only on the first fragment (the if (!*mem)
branch), and siw_rresp_check_ntoh() compares the cumulative length against
wqe->bytes only on the final segment (the !frx->more_ddp_segs guard).
A connected siw peer that answers an outstanding RREAD with Read Response
segments that keep the DDP Last flag clear, carrying more total payload
than the RREAD requested, drives wqe->processed past the validated sink
buffer; the next siw_rx_data() call writes out of bounds at
sge->laddr + wqe->processed. siw runs iWARP over ordinary routable TCP,
so the peer is the remote end of an established RDMA connection and needs
no local privilege.
Bound every segment before placement, exactly as siw_proc_send() and
siw_proc_write() already do for their tagged and untagged paths, and
terminate the connection with a base-or-bounds DDP error when the
Read Response would overrun the sink buffer.
This is the second receive-path length fix for this file. A separate
change rejects an MPA FPDU length that underflows the per-fragment
remainder in the header decode; that guard does not cover this case,
because here each individual segment length is self-consistent and only
the accumulated placement offset overruns the buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size
mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a
fixed-size on-stack buffer
struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH];
which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes,
i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from
the device:
packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE);
if (packet_size <= 0)
goto out;
...
error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size,
(u8 *)touch);
packet_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check
is the lower bound packet_size <= 0; it is never bounded against the
size of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller
(or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of
up to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of
touch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can
overwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address.
A well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject
an oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler's
other error paths, rather than reading past the buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count
goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported
by the device into an on-stack buffer
u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS];
which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only
runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts->max_touch_num,
but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device
configuration block and is never clamped:
ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f;
The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit
controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up
to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num
of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes
ts->contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into
point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the
92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write.
Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts
point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Pin source page for write when adding CPUID data for SNP guest
When populating a guest_memfd instance with the initial CPUID data for an
SNP guest, acquire a writable pin on the source page as KVM will write back
the "correct" CPUID information if the userspace provided data is rejected
by trusted firmware. Because KVM writes to the source page using a kernel
mapping, pinning for read could result in KVM clobbering read-only memory.
Note, well-behaved VMMs are unlikely to be affected, as CPUID information
is almost always dynamically generated by userspace, i.e. it's unlikely for
the CPUID information to be backed by a read-only mapping.
[sean: rewrite shortlog and changelog, tag for stable@] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qat - validate RSA CRT component lengths
The generic RSA key parser (rsa_helper.c) bounds each CRT component (p,
q, dp, dq, qinv) by the modulus size n_sz, but qat_rsa_setkey_crt()
allocates half-size DMA buffers (key_sz / 2) and right-aligns each
component with:
memcpy(dst + half_key_sz - len, src, len)
When a CRT component is larger than half_key_sz the subtraction
underflows and memcpy writes past the DMA buffer, causing memory
corruption.
Add a len > half_key_sz check next to the existing !len check for each
of the five CRT components so the driver falls back to the non-CRT path
instead of writing out of bounds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: keyspan_pda: fix information leak
The write() callback is supposed to return the number of characters
accepted or a negative errno. Since the addition of write fifo support
the keyspan_pda implementation will however return the number characters
submitted to the device if the write urb is not already in use. If this
number is larger than the number of characters passed to write(), the
line discipline continues writing data from beyond the tty write buffer.
Fix the information leak by making sure that keyspan_pda_write_start()
returns zero on success as intended. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Validate BTF repeated field counts before expansion
btf_parse_struct_metas() walks user-supplied BTF during BPF_BTF_LOAD,
and btf_repeat_fields() expands repeatable fields from array elements
into the fixed BTF_FIELDS_MAX scratch array used by btf_parse_fields().
The remaining-capacity check performs the expanded field count calculation
in u32. A malformed BTF can wrap that calculation, causing the check to
pass even when the expanded field count exceeds the scratch array
capacity. The following memcpy() can then write past the end of the
array.
Use checked addition and multiplication before copying repeated fields
and reject impossible counts. |
