| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: catc: enable basic endpoint checking
catc_probe() fills three URBs with hardcoded endpoint pipes without
verifying the endpoint descriptors:
- usb_sndbulkpipe(usbdev, 1) and usb_rcvbulkpipe(usbdev, 1) for TX/RX
- usb_rcvintpipe(usbdev, 2) for interrupt status
A malformed USB device can present these endpoints with transfer types
that differ from what the driver assumes.
Add a catc_usb_ep enum for endpoint numbers, replacing magic constants
throughout. Add usb_check_bulk_endpoints() and usb_check_int_endpoints()
calls after usb_set_interface() to verify endpoint types before use,
rejecting devices with mismatched descriptors at probe time.
Similar to
- commit 90b7f2961798 ("net: usb: rtl8150: enable basic endpoint checking")
which fixed the issue in rtl8150. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Fix buffer over-read in cca_cipher2protkey
Add validation of both the actual key buffer size and token length
fields in all the cca_check_sec*token() functions. Additionally check
in cca_gencipherkey() for possible underflow with returned key size.
The CCA token structures contain user-controlled len fields that
were used in operations without proper validation against both the
actual buffer size and minimum token structure size. An attacker
could set this field larger than the actual buffer size, leading to
reading beyond buffer boundaries. This may result in a kernel crash or
exposure of memory via sending this as part of a request down to the
crypto card. Also an attacker could have used a very small len value
and thus enforce a buffer under-run which may produce similar effects
as a over-read.
So now a key must
- key buf length must be at least sizeof the token struct
- the key len field inside the token must fit into the range of
sizeof key token struct ... key buf length |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix MCIA register buffer overflow on 32 dword reads
The MCIA register can return up to 32 dwords (128 bytes) when the device
advertises the mcia_32dwords capability, but struct
mlx5_ifc_mcia_reg_bits only defines dword_0..11, leaving room for just
12 dwords (48 bytes) of data.
mlx5_query_mcia() clamps the read size to mlx5_mcia_max_bytes() and then
memcpy()s that many bytes out of the register, potentially reading past
the end of the 'out' buffer. On kernels built with FORTIFY_SOURCE this
is caught as a buffer overflow while reading the module EEPROM via
ethtool:
detected buffer overflow in memcpy
kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1048!
RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0x13/0x20
Call Trace:
mlx5_query_mcia.isra.0+0x200/0x210 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_query_module_eeprom_by_page+0x4a/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_get_module_eeprom_by_page+0xbb/0x120 [mlx5_core]
eeprom_prepare_data+0xf3/0x170
ethnl_default_doit+0xf1/0x3b0
Extend the mcia_reg layout to 32 dwords. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: libwx: fix VF illegal register access
Register WX_CFG_PORT_ST is a PF restricted register. When a VF is
initialized, attempting to read this register triggers an illegal
register access, which lead to a system hang.
When the device is VF, the bus function ID can be obtained directly from
the PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: clamp v9 CRIU control stack checkpoint copy to BO size
CRIU checkpoint copies the MQD control stack using cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size
from hardware without bounding it to the allocated BO region. If the HW
field is larger than the queue's control stack allocation, memcpy reads
past the BO into adjacent GTT memory and can leak kernel data to userspace.
Store the page-aligned control stack BO size in mqd_manager and clamp
checkpoint copies and reported checkpoint sizes to
min(cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size, mm->ctl_stack_size). Apply the same bound
for multi-XCC v9.4.3 checkpoint layout.
(cherry picked from commit 6c2abd0ec09e86c6323010673766f76050e28aa3) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate minimum PDU size for transform requests
The receive path applies the minimum SMB2 PDU size check only when
ProtocolId is SMB2_PROTO_NUMBER. A packet carrying
SMB2_TRANSFORM_PROTO_NUM bypasses the check even when the negotiated
dialect does not provide transform handling.
On an SMB 2.1 connection, a short transform packet therefore reaches
init_smb2_rsp_hdr(), which interprets the request as a full SMB2 header
and reads beyond the request allocation. The copied fields can then be
returned to the unauthenticated client.
Compression transforms are converted to ordinary SMB2 messages before
protocol validation. After that conversion, validate ordinary SMB2
requests against SMB2_MIN_SUPPORTED_PDU_SIZE and require encryption
transform requests to contain both a transform header and an SMB2
header. This rejects truncated requests before work allocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: reject optional IPTFS templates in outbound policies
syzbot reported a stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find()
which flows from xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one().
Commit 3d776e31c841 ("xfrm: Reject optional tunnel/BEET mode
templates in outbound policies") disallowed optional tunnel and
BEET in outbound policies to prevent this. Later when IPTFS
added, it was not covered by that fix and can still trigger
the out-of-bounds read;
Extend the check to disallow optional IPTFS in outbound policies
as well. IPTFS should be identical to tunnel mode.
IN and FWD policies are not affected: xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one()
is only reachable via the outbound path.
Reproducer, before:
ip link add dummy0 type dummy
ip link set dummy0 up
ip addr add 10.1.1.1/24 dev dummy0
ip xfrm policy add src 10.1.1.1/32 dst 10.1.1.2/32 dir out tmpl
src fc00::dead:1 dst fc00::dead:2 proto esp reqid 1 mode iptfs
level use tmpl src fc00::dead:1 dst fc00::dead:2 proto esp reqid
2 mode transport
ping -W 1 -c 1 10.1.1.2
PING 10.1.1.2 (10.1.1.2) 56(84) bytes of data.
[ 64.168420] ==================================================================
[ 64.169977] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[ 64.169977] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800e1ffd20 by task ping/2844
[ 64.169977] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 2844 Comm: ping Not tainted 7.1.0-rc7-00180-geb23b588430a #98 PREEMPT(full)
[ 64.169977] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 64.169977] Call Trace:
[ 64.169977] <TASK>
[ 64.169977] dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x70
[ 64.169977] ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[ 64.169977] print_report+0x152/0x4b0
[ 64.169977] ? ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x6d/0xa0
[ 64.169977] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 64.169977] ? rcu_read_unlock_sched+0xa/0x20
[ 64.169977] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x21b/0x230
[ 64.169977] ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[ 64.169977] kasan_report+0xa8/0xd0
[ 64.169977] ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[ 64.169977] __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[ 64.169977] __xfrm_dst_hash+0x24/0xc0
[ 64.169977] xfrm_state_find+0xa2d/0x2f90
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_state_find+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one+0x210/0x570
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? kernel_text_address+0x5b/0x80
[ 64.169977] ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
[ 64.169977] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x5e/0x90
[ 64.169977] ? arch_stack_walk+0x8c/0xe0
[ 64.169977] xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x130/0x200
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup_rcu+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __refcount_add_not_zero.constprop.0+0xb2/0x110
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx___refcount_add_not_zero.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0xd5/0x310
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x3d8/0xb80
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? ip_route_output_key_hash+0xc6/0x110
[ 64.169977] ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
[ 64.169977] xfrm_lookup_route+0x18/0xe0
[ 64.169977] ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x4c9/0x530
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x71/0xc0
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] release_sock+0xb0/0x170
[ 64.169977] udp_connect+0x43/0x50
[ 64.169977] __sys_connect+0xa6/0x100
[ 64.169977] ? alloc_fd+0x2e9/0x300
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx___sys_connect+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? preempt_latency
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: nxp: imx8-isi: Fix potential out-of-bounds issues
The maximum downscaling factor supported by ISI can be up to 16. Add
minimum value constraint before applying the setting to hardware.
Otherwise, the process will not respond even when Ctrl+C is executed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: make huge_ptep_get handled unaligned addresses
huge_ptep_get() can be handed a virtual address pointing to the middle
of a contpmd/contpte mapped hugetlb folio (examples of callers are
pagemap_hugetlb_range, page_mapped_in_vma).
The arm64 helper rewalks the pgtables in find_num_contig to answer
whether the huge pte we have maps a contpmd or a contpte hugetlb folio,
and returns CONT_PMDS or CONT_PTES, so that it can collect a/d bits over
the contiguous ptes. We can falsely return CONT_PTES instead of
CONT_PMDS if the addr is not aligned. On systems where CONT_PTES !=
CONT_PMDS (meaning page size is 16K), we could collect excess A/D bit
state, meaning extra work for the kernel. Even worse, we may iterate
beyond the PTE table and dereference a garbage ptep pointer to access
physical memory we don't own. Since the ptep pointer is a linear map
address, we may run off the end of the linear map or into a hole,
dereference a VA not mapped into the kernel pgtables and cause kernel
panic.
Fix this by aligning the pmdp pointer down to a contpmd base before
checking equality with the passed huge pte pointer, to correctly answer
whether the huge pte is the base of a contpmd block. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl
set_ntacl_dacl() copies each ACE from the attacker-controlled stored
security descriptor verbatim into the response DACL without checking
sid.num_subauth. The ACE bytes (including an unchecked num_subauth)
originate from an authenticated SMB2_SET_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) that is
stored raw via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(); parse_dacl() rejects a bad ACE
with `break` rather than an error, so parse_sec_desc() still returns
success and the malformed SD reaches the xattr intact.
On a subsequent SMB2_QUERY_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) for an inode carrying a
POSIX access ACL, build_sec_desc() -> set_ntacl_dacl() ->
set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() walks the copied ACEs and reads
ntace->sid.sub_auth[ntace->sid.num_subauth - 1]
with num_subauth taken straight from the stored SD. Since sub_auth[]
is fixed at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15), a crafted num_subauth (e.g.
255) drives an out-of-bounds heap read of ~1 KB with an offset fully
controlled by an authenticated client.
The sibling functions already gate this field:
parse_dacl() -- num_subauth == 0 || > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
parse_sid() -- num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
smb_copy_sid() -- min_t(u8, num_subauth, SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
set_ntacl_dacl() is the lone inconsistent path that omits the check.
Add the same num_subauth validation in set_ntacl_dacl() before copying
the ACE, matching the gate already enforced by parse_dacl(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: bound DACL dedup walk to copied ACEs
set_ntacl_dacl() can stop copying ACEs before consuming the full input
DACL when size accounting overflows.
When that happens, num_aces reflects only the ACEs that were actually
copied into the output DACL, but set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() still
receives nt_num_aces and uses it to walk the existing ACE array during
dedup.
That makes the dedup walk scan past the copied ACE array and inspect
buffer tail that does not contain valid ACEs.
Split the two meanings currently carried by the NT ACE count. Pass the
number of copied NT ACEs to bound the dedup walk, and preserve the
original "input DACL had NT ACEs" state separately for the
Everyone/default ACL fallback.
This keeps the dedup walk aligned with the ACEs that are actually
present in the rebuilt DACL. |
| Improper input validation in Samsung Android USB Driver for Windows prior to version 1.9.5.0 allows local attacker to access out-of-bounds memory. |
| A flaw was found in libtiff. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by providing a specially crafted PixarLog-compressed TIFF image. This issue occurs when decoding Pixarlog codec images with the PIXARLOGDATAFMT_8BITABGR output format and a specific stride value, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. This could potentially result in arbitrary code execution or a denial of service (DoS). |
| Parsing an invalid SVCB or HTTPS RR can panic when the size of a parameter value overflows the message buffer. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service and modify authentication metadata due to a buffer overflow. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an out-of-bounds read. |
| Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 0.29.2, the experimental dynamic client registration and client ID metadata document features in the @backstage/plugin-auth-backend use full-string matcher.isMatch glob matching for auth.experimentalDynamicClientRegistration.allowedRedirectUriPatterns and the auth.experimentalClientIdMetadataDocuments allowedClientIdPatterns and allowedRedirectUriPatterns options. A hostname wildcard can match across URL component boundaries, allowing an attacker-controlled redirect URI with a trusted hostname suffix in its path to pass the allowlist and receive an OAuth authorization code after a victim completes the flow. Patterns without an explicit protocol can match unintended protocols, and redirect URIs containing embedded credentials are accepted after user information is stripped for matching. The features are experimental and disabled by default; only deployments that enable them and configure custom wildcard-hostname or protocol-less patterns are affected. This issue is first fixed in prerelease version 0.29.2. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
