| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 3.8.0 to 4.12.33, memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator equal props, and request scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request. Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone; values read implicitly during rendering, such as JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage, do not participate, and the retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it. A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user when both render the same memoized component with comparator equal props on the same warm instance, which may disclose another user's account or profile data, disclose request scoped secrets embedded in HTML such as CSRF tokens, or expose role specific content to users who should not receive it. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34. |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 4.7.0 to 4.12.33, the Proxy Helper proxy() function in hono/proxy does not remove response headers named by the origin's Connection header. Per RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1, an intermediary must remove the header fields listed in a message's Connection header field before forwarding the message, in addition to the well known hop by hop headers, but the proxy() function only removed the well known hop by hop headers, including Connection itself, from origin responses. A client may therefore receive response headers that the origin intended only for its immediate peer, disclosing connection scoped or internal metadata contained in such headers, when an application proxies responses from an origin that declares additional, non standard headers as hop by hop via the Connection response header. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34. |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 4.12.0 to 4.12.33, the languageDetector middleware is vulnerable to algorithmic complexity denial of service when processing a crafted language tag containing a large number of hyphen separated subtags. To implement progressive language tag truncation, normalizeLanguage() repeatedly calls parts.slice(0, i).join('-') for every possible prefix, so the total amount of string processing grows quadratically with the number of subtags. Language values may come from a query parameter, cookie, Accept-Language header, or URL path, depending on the detector configuration, and the default detector order enables query string, cookie, and header detection, so applications using languageDetector() may expose this processing to unauthenticated requests. An attacker may repeatedly send requests containing long, hyphen separated language tags, causing excessive CPU consumption and preventing unrelated requests from being processed. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34. |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.12.34, the built-in CORS middleware, hono/cors, is vulnerable to a regular expression denial of service (ReDoS). During a preflight OPTIONS request, the middleware parses the attacker-controlled Access-Control-Request-Headers header using a whitespace-tolerant regular expression whose backtracking makes its running time quadratic in the input length. Because the header value is bounded only by the deployment's maximum HTTP header size, a single preflight carrying a long run of whitespace can consume seconds of CPU and block request processing. On runtimes that share one execution thread across requests, this stalls concurrent requests as well, and repeated requests can render the service unresponsive. This affects the default configuration, since the vulnerable path is reached whenever cors() is used with an unset or empty allowHeaders. Applications that set a non-empty allowHeaders are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34. |
| Hono before 4.11.10 contains a timing attack vulnerability in the basicAuth and bearerAuth middlewares due to non-constant-time string comparison in the timingSafeEqual function. Attackers can exploit early termination of string equality checks to infer valid credentials through precise timing measurements. |
| Hono before 4.12.7 allows __proto__ key in parseBody with dot option enabled, permitting specially crafted form field names to create objects with __proto__ properties. When parsed results are merged into regular JavaScript objects using unsafe merge patterns, attackers can exploit this to achieve prototype pollution and modify object behavior. |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 4.3.3 before 4.12.27, the AWS API Gateway v1 adapter can drop a distinct repeated request header value because it de-duplicates values using a substring comparison instead of an exact match, so middleware or application logic that depends on the complete X-Forwarded-For chain, rate limiting, audit logging, or proxy-chain validation can receive incomplete data. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.27. |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 4.11.8 before 4.12.27, hono/jsx did not isolate context values per request during server-side rendering, allowing createContext, useContext, jsxRenderer, or useRequestContext data from a different in-flight request to be used after an await in an async component. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.27. |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 4.0.0 before 4.12.27, cx() in hono/css composes class names from plain strings but marks the result as already escaped without HTML-escaping the input, allowing untrusted className values used in a JSX class attribute during server-side rendering to break out of the attribute and inject arbitrary markup. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.27. |
| Hono before 4.10.2 (fixed in 4.10.3) contains a flaw in its CORS middleware: when the origin is not set to "*", the middleware copies the Vary header from the incoming request into the response. Because Vary is a response header that should be managed by the server, an attacker can supply arbitrary Vary values that are reflected into the response, potentially causing cache key pollution and inconsistent CORS enforcement in environments that rely on shared caches or proxies. |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.12.25, on AWS Lambda, the ALB single-header response and the VPC Lattice v2 response join multiple Set-Cookie headers into one comma-separated value. Because commas also appear inside cookie attributes (for example Expires dates), clients cannot split the value back into individual cookies and silently drop or misparse them. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.12.25. |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.12.25, on Windows hosts, an encoded backslash (%5C) in the request path decodes to \, which the Windows path resolver treats as a separator. serve-static then resolves a single URL segment such as admin\secret.txt into a nested file under the root and serves it, letting an attacker read static files meant to be protected behind prefix-mounted middleware. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.12.25. |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.12.25, with credentials: true and no explicit origin (the default wildcard), the CORS Middleware reflects the request's Origin and sends Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. Any site can then make credentialed cross-origin requests and read the responses, exposing cookie-authenticated endpoints to arbitrary origins. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.12.25. |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.12.25, on AWS Lambda@Edge, CloudFront delivers a request header that appears more than once as several separate entries. The adapter writes each value with Headers.set instead of Headers.append, so every value overwrites the previous one and only the last reaches the application. Repeated request headers such as X-Forwarded-For, Forwarded, and Via are silently truncated to a single value. Request middleware sees only the last value of a repeated header instead of the full chain. For applications that base access control on the X-Forwarded-For chain, this can weaken or alter that decision; for auditing, hop history is lost. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.12.25. |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.12.25, the Body Limit Middleware trusts the request's Content-Length header to decide whether a body is within the limit. On AWS Lambda (API Gateway v1/v2, ALB, VPC Lattice, and Lambda@Edge) the body is delivered fully buffered and the adapter builds the request with the client-declared Content-Length, which need not match the actual payload. A client can declare a tiny Content-Length while sending a much larger body, slipping past the limit. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.12.25. |
| hono before 4.12.14 contains an html injection vulnerability in jsx server-side rendering that allows attackers to inject unintended html by using malformed attribute names. Attackers can craft specially crafted attribute keys containing characters like quotes or angle brackets to break html tag boundaries and inject arbitrary attributes or elements. |
| Hono before 4.12.12 does not validate cookie names on the write path in the setCookie(), serialize(), and serializeSigned() functions, allowing invalid characters such as control characters (e.g. \r or \n) when an application passes a user-controlled cookie name. This can produce malformed Set-Cookie header values. In modern runtimes such as Node.js and Cloudflare Workers, such invalid header values are rejected and cause a runtime error before the response is sent, so header injection or response splitting could not be reproduced; the issue primarily affects correctness and robustness, resulting in runtime errors (availability) rather than confirmed header injection. |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.12.21, the ip-restriction middleware (hono/ip-restriction) compares incoming IP addresses against configured deny and allow rules using string equality after partial normalization. Non-canonical IPv6 representations of an address already listed in a static rule — such as compressed forms, explicit-zero forms, or hex-notation IPv4-mapped addresses — do not match the normalized rule entry, causing the rule to be silently skipped. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.12.21. |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.12.21, the jwt and jwk middlewares do not verify that the Authorization header value uses theBearer scheme. Any two-part header value — regardless of the scheme name in the first position — proceeds to JWT verification. A request presenting a valid JWT under a non-Bearer scheme identifier (such as Basic or Token) is authenticated identically to a correctly formed Bearer request. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.12.21. |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.12.21, the serialize() function in hono/cookie validates domain and path options against characters that corrupt Set-Cookie header syntax (;, \r, \n), but does not apply the same validation to sameSite and priority. An application that passes user-controlled input into either option may produce a Set-Cookie response header containing attacker-chosen additional attributes. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.12.21. |
