| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Version 5.0.9 added a missing `isAdministratorInventory()` gate to `case 'item_delete':` in `modules/inventory.php`. The same fix was not applied to the sibling `case 'field_delete':` handler, which destroys an entire inventory field definition, cascading to every `adm_inventory_item_data` row that referenced that field and every `adm_inventory_field_options` entry. The handler validates only a session-bound CSRF token; there is no `isAdministratorInventory()` check at the controller level, and `Admidio\Inventory\Entity\ItemField::delete()` does not enforce one at the entity level either (unlike its sibling `ItemField::save()`, which does check `$gCurrentUser->isAdministrator()`). Any user who can log in to the site can permanently destroy a non-system inventory field by sending one POST. Version 5.0.10 provides an updated fix. |
| Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.10, `modules/sso/clients.php` validates an `adm_csrf_token` on every state-changing branch except `enable`. The `enable` case loads the SAML or OIDC client by UUID, calls `$client->enable($enabled)`, and persists the new state with no token check. Because the action is reachable via plain GET parameters, a third-party page can trick an authenticated administrator into disabling (or silently re-enabling) any configured SAML or OIDC client. Disabling an SSO client breaks every downstream relying-party application that authenticates through it. Version 5.0.10 contains a fix. |
| Admidio is an open-source user management solution. `modules/categories.php` checks that the supplied `type` parameter (`ANN`, `EVT`, `ROL`, `USF`, …) corresponds to a module the actor administers. The follow-up "is this specific category editable by me" check at lines 56-61 is dead code because it compares `$getType` (a category-type code) against mode names (`edit`/`save`/`delete`); the condition is permanently false, so `$category->isEditable()` is never invoked. Prior to version 5.0.10, the `delete`, `sequence`, and `save` switch cases load the category by the supplied UUID and act on it without re-checking that the category belongs to a module the actor administers. A user holding only one module-administrator right can therefore destroy or reorder empty categories belonging to *other* modules — for example, an announcements administrator can delete role categories, profile-field categories, or weblink categories that they have no right to touch. Version 5.0.10 fixes the issue. |
| Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.10, when debug logging is enabled, `Session::setCookie()` logs full cookie values and `Session::start()` logs the current session ID. In a real Admidio deployment this includes both the active session cookie and the persistent auto-login cookie. Anyone with access to the log sink can recover live bearer-style credentials from the logs. Version 5.0.10 contains a fix. |
| Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.10, `modules/documents-files.php` mode `file_rename_save` shares the same root-cause shape as the cross-folder move bug (`05-documents-cross-folder-move-idor.md`): the top-level rights check at lines 79-89 validates `hasUploadRight()` on the URL parameter `folder_uuid`, but the rename operation acts on `file_uuid` — a separate URL parameter — without re-checking the folder that actually contains the file. `DocumentsService::renameFile()` resolves the target file via `getFileForDownload()` (which permits view-readable files) but does not require upload right on the file's source folder. Result: a user with upload right on any folder A can rename a file in folder B as long as they can view it. They can also overwrite the file's description. Version 5.0.10 contains a fix. |
| Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.10, an authenticated Admidio member with upload rights on any one folder can permanently delete files from folders where they have only view access. The authorization check at the top of `modules/documents-files.php` evaluates upload rights against the attacker-supplied `folder_uuid` URL parameter — not the file's actual parent folder. The `file_delete` handler then only verifies view rights on the file's real location, never upload rights. By passing a folder they legitimately own in `folder_uuid` while targeting a file in a restricted folder via `file_uuid`, an attacker bypasses the upload-right check entirely and permanently deletes the file. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-rmpj-3x5m-9m5f, which was patched in v5.0.7 but remains exploitable in v5.0.9. User should upgrade to v5.0.10 to receive an updated fix. |
| Admidio is an open-source user management solution. `modules/registration.php` mode `send_login` regenerates a random password for `user_uuid_assigned`, stores its bcrypt hash in `adm_users.usr_password`, and emails the cleartext to that user. Every other state-changing mode in the same file (`assign_member`, `assign_user`, `delete_user`, `create_user`) calls `SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token'])` first; the `send_login` branch does not. Prior to version 5.0.10, page visited by a registration-administrator can issue the request as a top-level navigation, the browser sends the admin's `SameSite=Lax` cookies, and the server resets the chosen user's password without any further interaction from the admin. Version 5.0.10 fixes the issue. |
| Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.10, `modules/documents-files.php` gates state-changing modes by checking that the actor has `hasUploadRight()` on the URL parameter `folder_uuid`. The `move_save` handler then operates on a *separate* URL parameter `file_uuid` and calls `File::moveToFolder($destFolderUUID)`. `File::moveToFolder()` checks the upload right on the destination folder but never on the source folder containing the file. As a result, any user who can upload to any single folder can move any file from any other folder — including private folders to which they have no view rights — into a folder they control, and then download it. Confidentiality is broken (private file contents leak) and integrity is broken (the file is removed from the original location). Version 5.0.10 contains a fix. |
| Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.10, the sensitive `mode=export` action in `modules/sso/keys.php` exports a PKCS#12 bundle containing the configured private key and certificate, but the CSRF validation line is commented out. A forged cross-site POST from an administrator session can therefore trigger private key export without a valid form token. Version 5.0.10 contains a fix. |
| Admidio before 5.0.11 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in the save_temporary mode of mylist_function.php that allows authenticated users to hijack list configurations. Attackers can enumerate global list UUIDs and overwrite admin-curated global lists or other users' private lists by supplying a list_uuid parameter, transferring ownership and demoting global lists to personal configurations. |
| Admidio before 5.0.11 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the forum module when configured in login-only mode. The access control logic in modules/forum.php fails to validate the login-only configuration state, allowing unauthenticated attackers to read forum topics and posts by directly accessing the module with read-only parameters. |
| Admidio versions before 5.0.11 contain a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability in the SSO/SAML endpoint that echoes unencoded exception messages to the HTTP response. Unauthenticated attackers can inject arbitrary JavaScript through SAML Issuer elements or LightSaml library parameters to execute code in users' browsers and hijack sessions. |
| Admidio before 5.0.11 does not validate the adm_csrf_token in modules/category-report/preferences.php, which performs persistent Category Report configuration changes based on GET parameters (delete and copy). An attacker can trick an authenticated administrator into visiting a crafted URL to delete or duplicate Category Report configurations, affecting the integrity and availability of that module's configuration. |
| Admidio before 5.0.11 fails to validate target organization membership in role handlers, allowing authenticated role administrators to delete, activate, deactivate, or edit roles belonging to other organizations. Attackers can supply a role UUID from another organization to groups_roles.php handlers to modify that organization's roles without authorization. |
| Admidio 3.3.5 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability that allows low-privilege users to increase their permissions by exploiting improper origin checking. Attackers can craft malicious HTML forms targeting roles_function.php with parameters like rol_assign_roles, rol_approve_users, and rol_edit_user set to 1 to escalate privileges without authentication. |
| Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the incomplete SSRF fix in Admidio's fetch_metadata.php validates the resolved IP address but passes the original hostname-based URL to curl_init(), leaving a DNS rebinding TOCTOU window that allows redirecting requests to internal IPs. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9. |
| Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the Admidio SAML Identity Provider implementation discards the return value of its validateSignature() method at both call sites (handleSSORequest() line 418 and handleSLORequest() line 613). The method returns error strings on failure rather than throwing exceptions, but the developer believed it would throw (per comments on lines 416 and 611). This means the smc_require_auth_signed configuration option is completely ineffective — unsigned or invalidly-signed SAML AuthnRequests and LogoutRequests are processed identically to properly signed ones. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9. |
| Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, an unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in any Admidio user's browser through a reflected XSS in system/msg_window.php. The endpoint passes user input through htmlspecialchars(), which does not encode square brackets. A subsequent call to Language::prepareTextPlaceholders() converts those brackets into HTML angle brackets, producing executable markup. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9. |
| Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the member assignment DataTables endpoint (members_assignment_data.php) includes hidden profile fields (BIRTHDAY, STREET, CITY, POSTCODE, COUNTRY) in its SQL search condition regardless of field visibility settings. While the JSON output correctly suppresses hidden columns via isVisible() checks, the server-side search operates at the SQL level before any visibility filtering. This allows a role leader with assign-only permissions to infer hidden PII values by observing which users appear in search results for specific values. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9. |
| Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the ecard_preview.php endpoint does not validate that the ecard_template POST parameter is a safe filename before passing it to ECard::getEcardTemplate(). An authenticated user can supply a path traversal payload (e.g., ../config.php) to read arbitrary files accessible to the web server process, including adm_my_files/config.php which contains database credentials. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9. |
